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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine a selected group of 
I !problems fundamental to the philosophy of science. No attempt 
I. 
will be made to treat all of the fundamental problems, nor will 
1
an exhaustive treatment be given to those problems that have 
I 
been selected. I The selection of the problems has been made in an 
II 
1
attempt to 
I 
include a representative group of problems. It is 
!; hoped that the order in which the problems are discussed is 
!J such that each problem follows naturally from the preceding one 
l1 and leads naturally to the subsequent one. 
I, 
II 
I 
I 
2. Method 
Each chapter, with the exception of Chapters I, II, and 
II 
'I II 
II 
I 
I 
II 
I 
IJ vrri, deals with a distinct problem. The first part of the I 
I - I 
nature of the problem under consideration. 
. I 
jchapter discusses the 
jThis is followed by a brief presentation and criticism of sever- / 
11 1 Jal representative solutions to the problem. Of the six problems " 
selected some are more speculative than others and some are more! 
'purely philosophical than others. No attempt has been made to 
/i divide the problems into two groups, t hose that are speculative 
.I 
i: and those that are not, or t hose that are purely philosophical 
·
1 and those that are purely scientific. Any such division is an 
II 
I 
l F=======================================~,~~ 
1 
;I 
!1 oversimplification of the nature of the problem. 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
3. Sources I 
There is a considerable amount of literature available in I 
·I 
/f the general area of philosophy and science. This amount depends [ 
d ' 
1
': to a large extent on how philosophy of science is defined. In ;i 
,, the broadest sense almost every contemporary philosophical work II 
1
1
, deals with or presupposes some scientific content, and most of I 
. I' 
J, the important literature in the various fields of scienc~ con- ~~ 
: tain indirect, if not direct, philosophical implications. 1: 
:I !Those writings which deal directly 
1
1 science and the broader meaning of 
Jl to be of the grea. test importance. 
with the foundations of 
scientific discoveries seem 
A division and classification may be made among the recent 
![ writers in the field according to how they stand professionally 
II 
rbetweenphilosophy and science. A philosopher ignorant of 
science, or a scientist ignorant of philosophy is not likely to 
!contribute anything positive to the field of philosophy of 
I 
~~ 
I 
I 
science; the significant advances will be made "by the nhiloso-
![ phically minded scientist and the scientificall;z: minded philoso-
1 1 ! 
,pher." The former group might include such men as Bridgman, 
!Eddington, Jeans, Weyl, Margenau, and Lenzen. Among thi3 group 
l
!some writers are more speculative and "popular'' while others 
1
/are more teclmical and critical, but again there is no sharp 
I. 
![ division. The latter group might include such men as Carnap, 
jl1. Benjamin, IPS, 37. 
========~===================================================================~ II 
I 
t 
II 
2 
1 Morris, Burtt, Benjamin, Werkmeister, and North rop. 
I' ,, 
,are some :few such as Russell and Whitehead who have 
IJ contributions to both fields. 
Then there !: 
made notable ;1 
'I 
:Most of the standard journals in both the areas of philoso- , 
1l phy and science contain at least occasional articles having to \I 
!do with the philosophy of scien~e. The journal, Philosophy of I 
' 
JI Science, as its name implies, deals exclusively with material 
I 
!relevant to the subject. Unfortunately, however, t his journal 
I 
\!h as recently been discontinued. The journal articles, on the 
!whole, are more critical and less speculative than are many of 
I! the books written in the area of philosophy of science~ although I 
I 
li thia quality alone does not necessarily make them of greater 1 
lvalue to a study of the philosophy of science. 
: 
i 
4 
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CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
A difficulty arises immediately in this investigation due 
· to the fact that the terms used in the statement of the purpose 
I 
of the investigation are ambiguous. The terms science, philos-
I 
ophy, and philosophy of science have been used in so many differ-
1 
ent senses that they cannot be left completely undefined. At 
the same time it is recognized that any strict definition of 
I 
these terms at the outset is in danger of overlooking certain 
l'viewpoints, and of solving problems by defining them out of 
~ 1existence. Somewhere between these two extremes lies, perhaps, 
1
the safest course. 
1. ~lhat is Science? 
I It is quite doubtful that there is any such thing as 
[science, apart from the particular sciences that go together to 
imake it up. We study biology, or physics, or psychology, we do 
1not study science. However, the biologist, physicist, and psy-
\chologist feel that they are part of the same general enter-
prise. This kinship, or sense of togetherness, arises from the 
1\similari ty of motives and methods that exists among the various 
\particular sciences. A definition of science, then, cannot be 
lpased upon the particular type of t hing which is being studied ~ ut primarily upon the motives behind the investlgation and the 
II . 1 
[! methods by which the investigation is carred on. 
1; There has been a tendency, especially among the scientists 
'i 
1
themselves, to regard science as the only legitimate way or 
!gaining knowledge or the universe.
2 
I
I Pearson defines the fu..nction of science as "the I . 
i
1tion of facts, the recognition of their sequence and 
:I 
classi:fica-1
1 
relative 
II 3 I; significance • 11 There are two disadvantages to this definition 
II 
w~ich render it useless for this discussion. 
I 
In the first place, this definition leaves the impression 
I 
!that science is descriptive and passive almost exclusively. 
I 
[The terms classification and recognition completely neglect the 
!
;fact that science is an active search for facts to a very im-
1 . 
i, portant extent. 
11 In the second place, the definition implicitly assumes that I 
II 
i[ any fact may be "classified" and thus become the object of 
II 
[study by science. There is indeed some question as to whether 
I -
1
1this is actually the case. A classification presupposes the 
jf existence of at least one entity common to two or more situa-
1 . 
ltions which at the same time differs ~uantitatlvely or qualita-
1 
I 
ltively from one situation to the next. At the same time, the 
I 
given entity from one situation ! !d etermination of the change in a 
II 1:1· 
,12. 
I 
I 
I 
13. 
1: 
1: 
__ I 
This statement must be qualified at a · later point. . 'I 
Pearson, GOS, 20. This statement, is, of course, quite true 
if knowledge is defined as the understanding which is gained 1 
through - the application of the scientific method. 
Pearson, GOS, 11. 
5 
li to another presupposes the endurance of some standard of com-
;j 
;j parison. But, the search for knowledge in a given area of 
I 
1
, study is usually not called science until change or difference 
;· 
i: is capable of being expressed quantitatively according to some 
II 
jobjective standard of measurement. Without measurement there 
! 6 
j, 
J==== I 
1can be no science, except in the crudest sense. In this inter-
j, pretation, measurement sets down limitations as to the kind of 
~~ faa t s that may be studied by science. That is , s c ien tit ic facts j1 
II are facts that can be described by measurable entities. :1 
I' I 
!I However, the purpose of this discussion is not to examine j 
!l and evaluate the possible definitions of science but simply to 
il 
I 
II advance a suitable definition of _ the term that vfill _ clarify its 
i· 
!! use in the subsequent discussion. The term science, then, is 
I' 
1l defined here as the search for an interpretation of the observ-
li able and measurable facts of experience~ for the sake of gain-
an understanding of the universe. 
2. Vfhat is Philosophy? 
The matter of defining the nature of philosophy is even 
I 1more controversial than the definition of science. One reason 
I 
:, is that most definitions of philosophy are inclined in the 
II 
[I direction that best suits the particular philosophy being ad-
11 vanced. A second reason is that too many people have dei'ined ~~ 
!: philosophy to correspond with what they would like to have phn-j
1 ~~ os ophy rather than what philosophy actually is • . I' 
It The logical positivists have defined philosophy as the logi~ 
j: I 
.I 
7 
' 1 -["-- ~-
cal syntax of language, or simply as logic. This definition 
raids in the elimination of all metaphysical problems from their 
system of t hought. But, the definition is a statement of what 
li they think philosophy should be, not what it act_ually is, and 
I! 
1
• for t h is reason cannot be adopted in t his discussion. 
Morris would reject "any conception of philosophy which 
1regards philosophy as proceeding by methods other than those of 
II - 2 
'· science." Rather than exclude any other possible method o:r 
II gaining knowledge, it might be better to adopt a broad defini-
1 
tion of philosophy and then distinguish between several differ-
1ent types of philosophies, or, branches of philosophy. Philos-
IOphy may be defined as the search for a coherent interpretation 
of all the facts of experience, and hence is more comprehensive 
I II 
than science. The type of philosophy which proceeds strictly 11 
i from the methods of science of philosophy. Without t h is broader 
1definition of philosophy it is meaningless to speak of philos-
1
ophy as having given rise to science. The fact that t h is paper I 
i' 1 deals primarily with those aspects of philosophy that are closely 
I· connected with science does not at all mean that there are not 
1
other equally import~nt aspects of philosophy. 
" 
3. Philosophy and Science. 
The difficulties experienced in the attempt by scientists 
land philosophers to define their respective fields of study has 
been an important contributing factor in the rise of philosophy 
1. Cf: · Carnap, Art. (1938); Neurath, Art. (1938); also Ducasse ~ 
==-=!2.-~~i~~:_A...!:r_~t~=1~tlou"""· ~-3\b<_s~l =o===================~1;===== 
Jl 
1: 
"1 i-, ------
of science. This is ample evidence for the assumption that 
despite any technical definitions that may be advanced for the 
, terms science and philosophy there exists an overlapping and 
I -2 
j/ interrelation of the two fields. The technical nature of this 
I
ll interrelation depends entirely on the definitions of the terms 
iphilosophy and science. By "technical nature" we mean that 
I, aspect of the interrelation which follows from the definitions 
,I 
li adopted for science and philosophy. The point is that there 
I 
1 exists an interrelation, which may be looked upon from several 
11 different points of view, technically, according to how the 
\ terms are defined. 
A comparison of the definitions advanced above for the 
: terms "philosophy" and 11 sci~nce" reveal the technical interrela j 
tions of the two fields as conceived here. In the first place, ! 
I I 
I! Whereas science must deal only with observable and measurable \' 
, 3 -I 
· facts in its empirical fou..lldation, philosophy _:ay, in _ addition, /l 
, deal with non- observable, introspective facts. Thus, the ex-
[; perience of value and purpose, non-observable entities, may con- : 
•I 
I stitute a part of the empirical foundation of a philosophy. The! 
1: study of logical relations is thus a legitimate branch of phil-
" I! osophy. 
Benjamin, IPS; 4 
Benjamin, IPS, 4-8; Planck, POP, 9; Eddington, PPS, 1; 
Jeans, -PAP, -2; Whitehead, AI, 187. 
Lenzen, ·PES. 
There is, of course, much more to be said on t his matter of 
introspective evidence, particularly in connection with the 
foundations of psychology as a science. The distinction 
made here is simply for the sake of definition and is not · 
meant as a positive statement on either side of the issue. 
II 
II 
!' II 
II 11 
9 
========!~I======================================================~~============*========= ~!In the second place, the results of science do not give a 1: 
I 
,1 total perspective to all experience since it does not 
1: study all of the facts of experience. Philosophy, on 
II . 
li han d, 
count of all experience. 
seeks a total perspective since it seeks a coherent ac-
There are, of course, many other contrasts that can be i! 
i' I! made 
·I between philosophy and science which, for reasons of spa.ce,
1
1 
'1 ' II 
!1 have 
/: 
been neglected here. The purpose of the above discussion 
jl has been to lay a foundation for a definition of the field of 
II . -
!I philosophy of science. A definition of philosophy of science 
11 2 
I !1 must presuppose definitions of philosophy and of science. 
II 
li 
I 
I 
! 
I 
,, 
4. Definition of Philosophy of Science. 
Philosophy of science may be called that area of study 
'i which lies in the region where science and philosophy overlap 
land are interrelated. This is not a satisfactory definition 
i\ 
[
1 since it gives no hil'lt as to the function of philosophy of 
11 science in that area. A more satisfactory definition is neces-
11 sary. 
I, 
Benjamin points out three factors wh ich have given rise t o 
' . ' ' 3 
field of study called "philosophy of science". One fac-
was the examination of the temporary reconciliation between 
fields of philosophy and science. A second factor "wasthe 
appearance, within science itself, of certain inconsistencies, 
- 4 
which compelled it to become self-critical." A third factor 
Brightman, ITP, 9-14; 
Ducasse, · PAS, Chap. I; 
Benjamin, IPS, 8-20. 
2~ 
3~ 
4. 
Benjamin; IP.l, 4. 
Ben~amin, IPS ; 21~ 
Benjamin, IPS, 21. 
I 
was the claim of science towards universality in every field of 
study. 
Benjamin defines philosophy of science in the following 
1 
manner: 
If the task of science is to explain scientific data by 
means of scientific hypothes~ then the task of the 
philosophy of science is to explain philosophical data 
by means of philosophical hypotheses! ~ut ~ philoso-
phical data ~. lrecisely the scient1.f1.c hyPotheses In 
their relationsh ps with ' the scientific data. 
This definition brings out clearly two functions of the 
philosophy of science. There is the comparison of scientific 
hypotheses with scientific fact and the comparison of the rela.:., · 
tionships that exist between different groups of scientific hy-
!potheses. This allows for the critical examination of the pre-
1 I 
·suppositions of science and the internal or logical structure of 
!science which is admittedly a large part of the task of philos-
lj 
,, 
,, 10 
ophy of science. But this definition does not allow for the 
!! examination of the relationships between science and I . 
I 
I 
other fields 
~: of study, or the broader interpretation of scientific truth as 
I' . . 
I 
!relevant to all of experience. These functions may be assigned 
I 
,strictly to philosophy as apart from science, but rather than 
,make such an artificial division it is perhaps better to assign 
Pthese tasks to the philosophy of science. 
I 
A more suitable definition of the function of philosophy 
2 
has been advanced by Malisoff: 
3 
Philosophy of Scienc~ is the organized expression of a 
I 
1. Benjamin, Art. {1938). 2. Malisoff, Art. (editoriall934!) 
3. Strictly speak ing , t h is is meant as a st~tement of · t he aims 
and purposes of the journal,~iloso~ of Science, which 
~-~aaumahl~ is t " an_iz._e_ . .x cr..as m:=:!!: _ _ 
- -- =-=-== =========== 
growing interest among philosophers and scientists to 
clarify, perhaps unify, the programs, methods and results 
of the disciplines of philosophy and of science. 
II 
no distinc -;1 [i The disadvantage of this definition is that it makes 
I 
1 tion between those areas which are purely science or philosophy 
il 
Ji and the area where the two fields of study overlap, even though i' 
it is perhaps impossible to separate comPLetely these var_ious I\ 
areas in a definition without distorting the true picture. 11 
II The following definition is advanced for the purposes of 
this discussion: Philosoph! of scie~ce is the critical exami~a11 
11 
tion of the presuppositions, methods, and concepts of science, 
II the examination of the relations of the special branches of 
science to each other and to other fields of study, and the 
lr 
! integration of the discoveries of science into the total picture:' 
" of human experience. There are, thus, three aspects of the 
1-
, function of philosophy of science. Of these three the first two r: 
I 
I are implicit in the definitions given by Benjamin and Malisoff. 
- -
i The third aspect goes 
I 
beyond these definiti?ns; it is admittedlYJ 
lr 
11 of a more speculative nature, but not less significant for that 
II 
I 
I 
1
reason. 
I 
1: 
,I 
II 
11 
; 
--·--
CHAPTER III 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 
1. The Nature of the Problem. 
1 the 
I 
.l lem 
II 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy which investigates
1 
nature of knowledge. In philosophy the epistemological pro~~­
is raised by the question, "How is knowledge possible, 11 or 
li "Of what do we possess knowledge?" 
/, 
I 
Since science seeks knowledge of some sort the epistemolog-1 
I leal problem is of primary importance to the philosophy of 
I science. There are indeed many aspects of this genera.l problem 
question this assumption as a part of its task. 
1 
The problem is often stated i n some such form as this: 
J I am faced by eertain facts of sense-experience. I have sensa-
1 
1
1 tions of color, touch , spatial relation, smell, hot and cold 
II 
11 which I a.m. accustomed to speak of as the room in which I sit. 
I walk about the room these sensations are continually 
1. 'II The brief description which follows is entirely superficial.1 
A much more complete presentation of the problem from tr~s I 
point of view is found in Russell, POP, 10-23. I 
I 
I 
12 
11 changing. 
I 
J 
I 
.Am I to infer that because my sensations are changing 
I 
1 the objects in the room are also changing? Certainly not, is 
the common reply, your experience of the things in the room 
changes because you observe them from changing positions. But 
this statement rests upon the assumption that there exist 
11 things 11 external to my own conscious experience which give 
rise to my experience. Is it possible to avoid this assumption 
I 
I and infer the existence of an external world from the facts of I 
' conscious experience? That is the problem. 
Both telephone and phonograph are equally removed from 
what the clerk might call the 'real external world', 
but they enable him, through theirsounds, to construct 
a universe; he projects the sounds, which are really in-
side h~s office, and speaks of them as the external uni-
verse • 
.According to Pearson, then, the ego is trapped; it cannot 
I 
, go beyond the terminus of the nerve endings in the brain. But, 
I 1. Pearson, GOS, 42-43, 56-58. 
2. Pearson, GOS, 57 
J! 
--II 
I 
13 
jl 
___ j _I 
1: if this view is correct then the external world, as Fullerton i 
II · 1 I 
i points out, is a construction of the sense data internally, 11 
! and is not external at all. Furthermore, it would be proper to 11 
II 
speak of the world existing in the ego, but the ego cannot, 
2 
the same time, exist in the world. If the nerve structure 
the brain are constructions of the sense-data inside of the 
at !I 
and lj 
I, 
ego J-
I as would be the case according to Pearson's view, how can a 11 
1: 
nerve structure which has a proper existence only within the ego 
convey any sense-data to the ego, from which, the ego could con11 3 ~ 
struct and project an external world? Pearson, it se~ms, woull 
have to revert to a complete solipsism in order to avoid these : 
I 
gross inconsistencies. 
1
1 
I 1 I I • 3. The Existence of the External World. 1 I I 
: How is this unsatisfactory view to be avoided? Fullerton' l/1!
1 
I answer is that 
Ill the plain man cannot be wrong in believing in the exter- 1 
I 
nal world which seems to be revealed in his experience. / 
We find that all attempts to discredit it rest upon the I 
I implicit assumption of its existence, and fall4to the 
1
,
1 
1 ground when that existence is honestly denied. 
1 
Pearson, then, in attempting to discredit the external world, 1/ 
I! 
implicitly assumed its existence in postulating a nervous sy~ I 
li and a brain. 
1 I Let us ex~ine another case of this implicit assumption. /' 
i Bertrand Russell refers to observations made while walking 
i 5 I j about a table. I 
\ 1. Fullerton, ITP; 42 4 ~ Fullerton, ITP, 44 I 
1 
2. Fullerton, ITP, 42 5. Russell, KEW, 77 I! 
3. Fullerton, ITP, 42 
L 
14 
Let us try to state what is known in terms of sensible 
objects alone, without any element of -hypothesis. "Ne 
find that as we walk around the table, we perceive a 
series of gradually changing visible objects. But in 
speaking of "walking round the table," we have still 
retained the hypothesis that there is a single table 
connected with all the appearances. 
li 
Good. Russell recognizes the implicit assumption made here. 
But, he goes on. 
What we ought to say is that, while we have those muscu-
lar and other sensations which make us say we are walk- -
ing, our visual sensations change in a continuous way •••• 
This is what we reany know by experience, when we have 
freed our minds from the assumption of pe:pmanent "things" 
with changing appearances. \~at is really known is a 
correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with 
changes in visual sensations. 
What right does Russell have to use the words "muscular", 
"visual", and "bodily", without implicitly assuming the exist-
ence of muscles, eyes, and body? Are we not driven to the con-
clusion, as above, that all that can be "known in terms of sen-
sible objects alone" is a complete solipsism? It seems, then, 
that we are driven to the assumption of the existence of an ex-
ternal world which cannot be derived from sense-experience. In 
this sense it is an a priori truth, an innate idea. Perhaps 
I 
I 
' I' 
II 
I 
It 
II this is what Eddington is referring to when he says that "a verl 
deep-rooted form of thought is that wh ich formulates the knowl-
1 
edge acquired by observation as a description of a world." 
I In another passage Russell admits the assumption of the ~~ 
I existence of an ext;rnal world, 
2 
but, in an entirely different 
1
.1 
I sense. Russell was, perhaps, too much of a positivist to admit I 
l l. Eddington, PPS, 115 
1
2. Russell, POP, 35 -~ 
1 
3. Russell's position has changed considerably since that time. 
15 
li==== 
II 
I 
iany kind of a priori idea. For him, the assumption of the 
I 
ience of the external world is a way of greatly simplifying 
exist-
11 
1
account of the facts of sense-experience, for, it is true, 
Its no way of refuting solipsism on logical grounds alone. 
the I 
there ! 
jipsism can be rejected on grounds of coherence. 
I 
4. The Ground for Induction. 
Sol-
The problem of the external world is closely related to 
the problem of induction. If we grant that there is a reality 
r outside of our own consciousness, how can we formulate a valid 
!method for arriving at an understanding of the external world? 
lwhat is the relation between the data of experience and the 
. concepts and hypotheses which we form from those data in order 
:to understand the external world? 
There are different interpretations of induction due to 
the widespread discussion of the subject. Induction is some-
. times thought of as having to do with the certainty of predict-
ing future events. This interpretation will not be discussed 
here since it is not so much a problem of induction as it is 
one of causality. 
we must examine two questions in order to reach the heart 
of the problem of induction: (1) 
which we can pass from particular facts to concepts and general 
laws?; and, (2) 
!knowledge which 
What kind of .certainty can be expected from 
has its basis in the verification of general 
laws in particular instances? I 
=--~~-' ----·. _j. 
I 
I 
16 
II 
,, 
11 17 
,, 
At no time in actual practice does a scientist pass from I 
' 1 
,pure fact to generalizations. This is to say that there is no 
I 
' such thing as a purely inductive method. In the laboratory a 
scientist records the readings of a number of instruments. The 
purely factual material in the situation is nothing more than a 
[series of numbers recorded on paper,or 
drum. An examination of these numbers 
a line traced on a moving! 
. If 
alone can never lead to, II 
I 
much less, imply a generalization ~theory. In the first 
place, the scientist has chosen to measure those quantities 
I 
II 
r 
,I 
which he believes to be relevant to the problem at hand. He mayj 
!select such quantities as length, time, temperature, pressure, : 
energy, or momentum. In all but the most elementary experiments !! 
I it is not possible to measure any of these quantities directly. 1 
The scientist must rely on instruments of varying complexity. 
!The operation of the instruments must be d~rived from existing 
I 
' theory and existing experimental standards. But, even more 
I 
II 
li 
,, ' 
'I 
important, the quantities which he seeks to measure are not 
directly factual but are conceptual. The quantities mass, 
1: 
I 
energy, and so on, are abstractions from factual situations. 
Granting the fact that there is no such thing as a purely induc- 11 
ti ve method, we wish to lmow at what point in the scientific 
1
J 
procedure is induction used. li 
The usual interpret!i; ion is that induction is used to form rl 
hypotheses from facts. But, the set of data which just precedes 
II 
the 
I 
formation of a generalization is not usually the mere brute 1 
:I ~ -----
11 1" 
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facts but consists of facts that have been thoroughly processed 
- II 
and interpreted by the existing deductive laws of the wcience. 
1
! 
The processed facts are now ready to be interpreted or general- ! 
ized in one or more hypotheses. Is there any method, set of 
' 
rules, by which the hypotheses can be formed from the facts? 
An examination of experimental work reveals that it is exactly 
1
[ at this point that the creative powers of the experimental sci-
I 
11 It is at this point that 1 
I 
entist are most heavily drawn upon. 
the technician, the follower of rules, is powerless to make the 11 
necessary jump from fact to hypothesis. There is no set of 
rules by means of which we may step from facts to hypotheses, 
I 
and thus no inductive meth od expressible in concise general !1 
'I 
terms. For this reason, among others, experience in the labora~ 
tory is a prerequisite to successful experimental research work. 
This does not deny the existence of induction as the development 
1: 
of facts into more general relatlons and hypotheses. It does li 
deny the existence of a precise method of procedure in t h is area 
of scientific work. 
There is another aspect of induction which has yet to be 
'I II 
I 
discussed. If we examine the structure of existing scientific· 
J knowledge in contrast to the methods of gaining that kn.owledge, 
II 
I 
I 
I a different axpect of the problem of induction arises. 
Scientific knowledge in its most refined form, as for ex-
ample in t heoretical physics, consists of -a set of definitions 
' and postulates for the most part in mathematical formulation. 
1 We may select a given problem or set of problems and apply the 
~==-= 1,~--~- --'==================~~=========;~===~ 
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' postulates and definitions to this particular case. This is a 
I 
purely deductive process requiring no reference to physical 
situations. Physical quantities may now be ascribed to the 
I symbols occurring in the solution of the problem and the equa-
tions may be said to represent a theory describing the behavior 
of certain entities under the stated conditions. The problem 
I
I of induction in this aspect arises in the verification of the 
! theory. 
I The verification of a single particular case does not, of 
course, verify the general law. In order to verify the general 
law completely, strictly speaking, it would be necessary to I 
I 11 
verify every particular instance of the general law. It will b j l 
noted that this aspect of induction is no longer concerned with 11 
the methods of gaining knowledge but with the certainty of in-
ductively verified knowledge. 
l1 There is complete agreement on the fact that scientific 
~ knowledge can never be certain, that is, completely verified 
1
in the above sense. A scientific theory or hypothesis may be 
!assigned a truth status which ranged from "very improbable" to 
"Highly probable", rather than from "impossible" to "certain". 
This notion of knowledge having varying degrees of probable 
1 truth has been quite generally accepted in a qualitative way. 
I 
Recent work in the mathematical theory of probability has st~u- 1 
lated much effort in the direction of putting the qualitative 
! . 
inotion of probable knowledge on a quantitative basis. 
~~ Since this work is highly technical it will not be discusse~ 
II 
I 
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~~in this thesis. The result of this work, however, does not 
/I change the status of empirically based knowledge, so as to 
j1 put it on a basis of certainty. It simply aims at expressing 
I[ the probable truth of theories and hypotheses in a much more 
i quantitative way. 
In the final analysis we cannot justify induction by any 
·: logical procedure. We accept it and use it because there seems 
i 
1 to be no other way to test our conjectures about the world. As 
1 
Russell puts it: 
I do ·not see any way out of a dogmatic assertion that 
we lmow the inductive principle, or some equivalent; 
the only alternative is to throw over almost everything 
that is regarded as knowledge by science and common 
sense. 
I. Schllpp, ed., PBR, 683. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE REALITY OF SCIENTIFIC OBJECTS 
1. Scientific Concepts and Conceptual Structure. 
The problem discussed above, that is, the existence of the 
external world, is one about . which the scientist is not con- j
1 
cerned. The scientist assumes the existence of an external worl d 
and attempts to describe certain aspects of that world. His 
I !picture of that world is constructed of a group of related con-
I 
i 
cepts. To define the term "scientific concept" at this point 
1would perhaps give unfair advadage to one or more 
I 
of the severa~ 
I views on the subject, f~or, each view would define the term in a 
I 
slightly different way. However, a few general remarks may be 
!made about the nature of scientific concepts and their related 
I 
' structure. 
II 
the only member of the scientific circle who is allowed to be 
free ofthis restriction. One of the chief purposes of a concept ' 
is that of generalizing and classifying the vast amount of de-
l tailed exper~ental data. But the process o£ generalizing in 
science requires not only the use of separate concepts but the 
I creation of a conceptual structure in which the 
\
!addition to being related to experimental facts 
each other consistently. 
concepts in 
are related to 
I' 
li 
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I 
I 
It is found in studying a given area of the physical world
1 
I 
that several different conceptual structures are useful, and 
sometimes even necessary, in order to describe the observed 
facts. The history of science shows that our conceptual struc- 1 
tures have been continually revised and sometimes almost com-
pletely abandoned. There are perhaps three principal reasons 
for this. 
I 
II 
In the first place science continually brings to light new l 
facts which must be incorporated into the conceptual structure 
of the theories. If the facts are inconsistent with the theory 
they it must be the latter which is eventually revised or even 
abandoned. The development of the conceptual picture of the 
atom illustratea the necessity of revision in the light of new 
experimental .facts. 
Secondly, the study of a given conceptual structure may 
reveal internal defects and inconsistencies which necessitate [ 
I 
revision or abandonment of the concepts. The decline of classi-
cal physics has been hastened by the discovery of inconsisten- I 
j, 
cies in the fundamental conceptual structure of Newtonian space ~~~ 
and time. 
~~ Finally, some concepts may lead to blank walls in the · 
I search for new scientific truth. That is, a useful concept or ~~ 
I generalization suggests new po~sibilities for research, new 1 
I 
I areas for study. The concept of a divine cause operating in i 
\1 the physical world is the type of concept that leads to a blank \ 
\\ wall for purposes of scientific investigation. I 
22 
The continual change of scientific concepts raises some 
question as to the meaning of a concept. The scientist carries 1 
1 out certain procedures on the physical world, the result being 
the data from which the concepts may be formed. But the brute 
data are almost always processed by certain knowing operations, !1 
I' processes of generalization, abstraction, and idealization, be- ; 
fore the data can be assimilated in conceptu& form. The con-
, cepts are thus dependent not only on the data but also on the 
knowing operations themselves to some extent. The functional 
relationship between the concepts (symbols) and the data and 
the knowing operations that process the data is represented by 
' 1 
the equation, 
C: f(D,O). 
By analyzing the extent to which 
1 this function we can distinguish 
II data and operations enter into I 
between several views on the II 
I 
1 meaning of · scientific concepts. 
2. The Problem. 
The problem of determining the reality of scientific con-
cepts is essentially one of determining the meaning of the 
concepts. This will be done by examining the extent to which 
the data and the operations enter into the structure of the con 1 
. I 2 
I 
cepts according to the various views discussed. 
Basic concepts such as mass, space, time, (or space-time), 
force, and energy, are defined in such a way that they may be 
1~ Benjamin, IPS, 149. 
2. This approach follows Benjamin's method of analysis. 
--·---·'=~ 
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!' measured, directly or indirectly, in a given situation. 
I' 
Thus, 
they are a function of data and knowing operations. In these 
I 
concepts then there is a reference to the physical world through 
I the data and operations. To determine the nature of this refer i 
I ence is to discover the nature of the meaning of the concepts 
11 and thus a measure of the reality of the objects to which they 
II 
I
; refer • . 
· This problem is perhaps one of the most . difficult in the 
1.: philosophy of science. Philosophers are handicapped by their 
lack of intimacy w.ith the scientific concepts, and scientists 
are handicapped by their restricted point of view in regard to 
this p~oblem. More confusion results from the fact that many 
writers on the subject of science, or the philosophy of science, 
do not take a clear stand in regard to the problem. 
1 
Benjamin 
distinguishes between the various views by pointing out the 
importance to each view of the data and the operations in the 
determination of a scientific symbol. Three main divisions 
-2 
result from this analysis. A fourth is added here for the 
sake of completeness. 
IJ 3. , Positivism. 
j Positivism is the doctrine that knowledge is of sense-
I! objects alone; hence, metaphysics, they claim, is a fantasy. A I 
'I discussion of positivism as a philosophy is not called for here l 
I . 
. I We need only consider here what might be called a positivistic 
1. Benjamin' IPS; 148 
2. Benjamin, IPS, 149-171 
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· l1 
view of scientific concepts. Karl Pearson's view of scientific 
concepts seems to be representative of the positivistic positio! 
- IJ 
Re-examining Pearson's definition of science, namely that 
science is "the classification of facts, ' the recognition of 
1 
their sequence and relative significance," it is easy to 
understand how Pearson arrives at a positivistic view of scien- 11 
tific concepts. Since science, according to t his view, is a 
description of sense-objects formed from t h e data given by 
sense-objects, scientific concepts are largely aids in the 
process of description. 
II 
I 
If 
II 
I 
Scientific concepts arise, then, out of the classification I/ 
of facts and their function is to economize thought. "They 1 
remain for him (the scientist) valig ideals so long as they / 
continue to economize his thought." They are a function of th~ 
data of science almost exclusively, according to this view. 
The knowing operations do not seem to play any significant part 
in the formation of scientific concepts. The. knowing operation~ 
are employed in t h e collection of facts but the concepts seem 
to be formed from the facts alone. 
Pearson would not deny that man's perceptive faculties 
condition the data which he receives. "Scientific law does 
not, any more than sense-impression, lie in a universe outside 
- 3 
and unconditioned by ourselves." The essential point is that 
1. Pearson, GOS, 11. 
2. Pearson, GOS, 154. 
3. Pearson, GOS, 75. 
I 
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II Pearson holds that we can know nothing of the world beyond what 1 
can be constructed from sense-data. "The right of science to l1 
II 
deal with the beyond of sense-impressions is not the subject of 1 
1 
, contest, :i'or science confessedly claims no such right." Since ~I 
we have no knowledge of what the data might be like before being 
conditioned by our perceptual apparatus, it is impossible to 
determine the effect which the knowing operations might have 
upon the data. In other words, the knowing operations may 
affect data before they become a part of our perceptual field 
I 
but scientific concepts must be constructed from the conditioned 
data alone without any knowledge of how the operations may have 11 
affected the data. Thus, the operat i ons play little part in thk 
I As for tbe reality of scientific concepts Pearson is again ll 
1 quite clear. By real he means "capable of being a direct sense l 
! impression," and by ideal "a purely mental conception by aid of i' 
.j which we are enabled to formulate natural laws." 
2 
This is the 11 
II 
. [ 
positivistic view. According to this view a scienti!'ic concept 11 
must be either real or ideal in this 
L~ 
2. 
Pearson, GOS, 96 
Pearson, GOS, 84 
sense. 
I! 
II 
I 
J . 
The planet Mars, aniwsl, bacteria, circular motion, mass, 
these are examples of scientific concepts to which reality can II 
be ascribed since they are capable of being direct sense- i 
II 
impressions. .Atom and molecule on the other hand "are intellec lL 
I 
tual conceptions by aid of which physicists classify phenomena, I 
. 1 
and formulate the relationships between their sequences." I 
' 
r.rhus, atom and molecule are ideal concepts, 
i 
their only justifi- ri 
they aid and ec ono- 11 cation for existence as concepts being that 
mize thought. 
one consequence of this positivistic view is that a con-
cept may pass from the ideal to the real stage. This has 
actually happened in the case of the molecule. The invention 
lr 
jl 
II 
II 
I of the electron microscope has enabled the concept of a molecule 
to pass from the ideal to the real stage. This does not mean _ 
1
1 
that the molecule having once been ideal is now a real "tl!Ding". 1 
This would be equivalent to a metaphysical statement and such 
1 statements cannot be allowed in positivism. 
It is doubtful H the atom, due to theoretical limitatlon.l
1
1 
on our ability to observe, can ever be a real concept in the 
positivistic sense. This theoretical limit on the ability to 
observe is made explicit in t he principle of uncertainty wh ich 
will be discussed at a later point. This theoretical limit 
' exists over and above · the practical clifficul ties that would 1:e I 
encountered in attempting to "see" an atom. Since a molecule 11 
is a complex of atoms we ar e led by this view to believe that ( 
II 
These conclusions 
.J 
a real concept is a complex of ideal concepts. 
1. 84. Pearson, GOS 
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must follow from Pearson's definition of real and ideal concept i . 
Science, according to Pearson's view, would seem to be a 
collection of related real and ideal concepts describing 
sense-impressions. But sense-impressions are private to each 
I 
II 
I 
I 
individual. What kind of objectl.vlty can science claim from suet 
a view? The positivistic view of Pearson fails to make any con~ 
nection between concepts and the external world which the con- I 
cepts are usually thought to describe. 
The positivism of Bridgman is more recent and in many 
ways much more satisfactory than that of Pearson. From the 
point of view of science Pearson's view of scientific conce~ 
is entirely too passive. That _ i~, concepts play a secondary 
role as aids in classifying data and economizing thought. This 
view neglects the active part that concepts play in guiding new
1 
experimental work. Also t h is view gives no hint as to the cri-
teria that should be established for constructing new concepts 
and revising old ones except in the passive sense. The results 
of modern physical research, particularly relativity and quan-
tum mechanics, have forced a re-examination of the meaning of 
scientific concepts. It is beyond the scope of t h is thesis to 
describe the results of modern physics and show the possible 
~plications o£ these results on the signi£icance o£ scienti£ic 
concepts. It is clear, however, that Bridgman's operationalism 
is representative, to a considerable extent, o£ a fairly large 
group o£ scientists who have been involved in modern physical 
fl research . There can be no doubt that the operational point of 
i 
I 
I 29 
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view is extremely valuable in understanding present scientific 
concepts. It is questionable, however, that the operational 
point of view is valid as an overall philosophy. 
The essence of the operational point of view toward con-
I cepts has been stated sili!PlY and concisely by Bridgman: "In I' 
general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of opera;-
tions; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of f' 
1 . 
operations." For example, the concept of length is defined by / 
the actual physical operations which we must carry out in order I 
I I to measure length. Since the set of operations used to measure 
I 
length on the microscopic scale is different .from the set of 
/ operations used to measure length on the astronomical scale, 
the concept of length cannot be the same for the two areas. 
It would appear at first sight that Bridgman's view means 
that a scientific concept is entirely determined by the knowing I 
operations and that experimental data play a secondary role in 
forming a concept. The operations which determine the concepts 
are not actually knowing operations; they are simply rules whic 
debMmine the specific procedures to be carried out in order to 
,I . . - . 
~~ gather the data. This view is definitely positivistic in the 
11 sense that knowledge of the physical world consists primarily _
1 
/j of' and cannot go beyond the empirical facts given by the senses ·II 
' Operationalism has important advantages over the strict I 
positivism of Pearson. In the first place it forces a critical \I 
I examination of all 
I 
-I 
scientific concepts from a new point of view J 
,, 
I 
1 1. Bridgman, LMP, 5 !' 
I 
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I 
The crucial test of the validity of a scientific concept is tha I 
I 
the concept specify clearly the operations or procedures asso- )I 
elated with it. Thus, Newton's concepts of absolute space and 11 
time , when examined f'rom the operational point of' view, have noli 
meaning and must be dropped as valid scientific concepts. 1
1
· 
Bridgman says little about the reality of the world which 
concepts describe, other than to take a positivistic stand. 
Thus, operationalism is probably open to the same criticisms 
that were made of Pearson's positifism as a philosophical view. 
4. Modified Positivism. ~ 
The difference between the positivisms discussed above and 
the modified positivisms which follow should not be thought of 
I, 
I 
as a difference in character so much as a difference in degree. 1 
I 
In the modified posi ti visms the knowing operations performed on !. 
the data play a more significant part in the formation of scienl 
tific concepts. 
In Pearson's and Bridgman's views scientific concepts are 
determined essentially by the experimental 
the significant idea that the concept must 
data. Bridgman adds 
specify the operatiol 
rl by which the data are obtained. But once the data have been 
collected and classified the corresponding concepts have essen-
tially been _determined. This view is adequate f'or the descrip-
tive and experimental sciences. 
However, an examin~on of mathematical physics on the 
highest level of abstraction shows little if any resemblance to 
the classified data of experimental physics. It is true that 
_j 
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from the abstract concepts of mathematical physics it is possi- 1' 
ble to predict experimental results. That is, it is possible il 
I, 
always to go from theory back to experimental data, or else the ji 
theory would have little scientific value. But the modified 
positivists insist that in forming some scientific concepts, 
I 
I 
particularly those of mathematical physics, certain procedures 
(knowing operations) are used which, although they are not die- ; 
tated by the data, play a significant part in forming the con-
cept. Poincare's conventionalism offers a representative des-
cription of this point of view. 
According to Poincare there are not only hypotheses (con-
cepts) that are "verifiable, and once confirmed by experiment 
become fruitful truths," but also those that "are hypotheses 
only in appearance and are reducible to disguised definitions 
- 1 
or conventions." The first type is the concept most closely 
associated with descriptive and experimental science and is 
adequately characterized by the operational point of view. The I 
! 
second type of concept, the convention, appears rather strange 
at first glance and one wonders whether this could be of great 
I 
enough importance to science to warrant a substantial change of 1 
posi tio~ with regard to the meaning o:f scientific concepts. 11 
Poincare leaves little doubt as to the importance o:f conventions 
;I to science and states the characteristics of conventions which 
2 
justify a modification of the strict positivistic view. 
, 
1. Poincare, FOS, 28 
1 2. Poincare, FOS, 28 
i 
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These last (the conventions) are met with above all in 
mathematics and the related sciences. Thence precisely 
it is that these sciences get their rigor; these con- · 
ventions are the work of the free activity of our mind, 
which in this domain, recognizes no obstacle. Here our 
mind can affirm, since it decrees; but let us understand 
that while these d~crees are imposed upon our science, 
which, without them, would be impossible, they are not 
imposed upon nature. 
This view emphasizes the creative aspect of science which seems 
1
: 
to be lacking in the straight positivistic views. I 
The exact difference between a convention and an empiri-
cally verified concept would require a detailed discussion of 
various scientific concepts. In brief it might be said that 
given a certain group of experimental facts it is usually pos~ir 
ble to construct more than one theory to describe those facts • . Ji 
In going from fact to theory certain assumptions, abstractions, 1: 
and idealizations are made in order to reduce the complexity 
of the conceptual scheme. Conventions arise from 
Thus, the conceptual world of mathematical physics contains 
such entities as mass points, frictionless planes, weightless 
strings, instants of time, n-dimensional space, and a host of 
li others. These concepts are not dictated by experimental data, 
'I nor should they be thought of as existing .outside of the con-
. 
i ceptual structure of mathematical physics. 
I I The fact that conventions are created by the mind does not~l 
II however, mean !hat they are purely arbitrary. If that were the I! 
I case science would be rather meaningless, which, certainly, it I 
is not. How are we to know, then, that a given convention is j, 
valuable to the conceptual structure of science? A given concept 
1: 
32 
is valuable if it is usefv~; t hat is, if it enables us to 
pre dict experimental results. 
The principle of conservation of energy is a good example 
of what is meant by a convention. This principle may be 
as fo l lows: the total energy i n a closed system remains con-
II 
;I 
II 
stant. If t he syst em under consideration is the entire physicai 
1: 
universe, then the principle says that the total energy of the 
universe remains constant. 
The h istory of science reveals that there have been a hum- IJ 
- I 
I ber of times when scientists had reason to question the validity 
' 
of t h e law of conservation of energy on the basis of experimen- ~ 
tal evidence. Some of these periods of doubt h ave been followed 
, by fundamental advances in physical theory: The quantitative li 
recognition of heat as a form of energy in the nine teenth een- 1 
tury put the principle on a firm foundation. 
I 
Without t his rec- i 
!I The same 
I! . 
is true with regard to electricity, magnetism, and other entities. 
ognition conservation of energy could not be verified. 
Recently it has been found that energy may be transformed into II 
J, 
There are two int erpret~tions 1/ 
t h at may be placed on t his fact: either (1) energy can in fact i 
, matt er and matt er into energy. 
be created and destroyed, thus placing serious limitations on j: 
I 
II 
i! 
the law of conservation of energy, or (2) mat t er is a form of 
energy, and the conservation principle r emains valid. The 
second interpretati on is, of cours~, the on e which has been _ 
accepted in all scient i fic circles. The h istorical development J 
of the principle of conservation of energy sh ows t hat it is I 
_jL 
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nothing more than a definition of energy and is thus a 
In other words, energy is defined as that which remains 
' 1 
I tauto1og:v. 
. II. 
constant 
in the physical universe. 
The fact that the principle is somewhat of a tautology 
does not bother the scientist in the slightest; he finds that 
the definition of energy in this way is advantageous in the 
' 2 
study of nature. 
Poincare would not at all minimize the importance ,of ex-
periment. "Experiment is the sole source of truth. It alone 
3 
can teach us anything new." But he warns against strict posi-
tivism. "The scientist must set in order. Science is built up 
II 
I 
with facts as a house is with stones. But a collection of facts 
4 · 11 
is no .more a science than a heap of stones is a house." Thus, · 
scientific concepts are determined both by experimental facts 
and by the procedures used in building up _the theory. 
To what extent can the resulting concepts be said to des- ~~ 
cri be an external reality? Po inc are I s answer to this question I; 
is not simple. In brief his answer mig..h.t be that through ~ci- . ) 
ence we can gain knowledge of the relations between things, but l 
not the things themselves. 
. 5 
I 
"Outside of these relations there is 
no knowable reality.u 
These relations in mathematical 
equations_ These equations, barring 
1. 
2. 
, 
Poincar~~ FOS.; 121 
Poincare, FOS, 144. 
Lindsay and Margenau, FOP, 526 
I 
physics are expressed by 
faulty mathematical reasonf 
. II 
3 ~ Poincare; FOS, 127 /11 
4~ Poincare, FOS; 127 , 
5. Poincare, FOS, 28 
II 
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I ing, are true. That is, the equations express true relations li 
li between the symbols that enter into the equations. The danger 
1
1 lies in the fact that we usually attempt to associate physical 
entities with the symbols. The history of physics shows that 
many times in the evolving of new conceptual structures the 
relations expressed by mathematical equations are carried over 
into the newer theories, but the physical significance of the 
I 
symbols must be changed to a considerable extent. 
But, if it were not for the physical significance that is 
attached to the symbols there could be no science of physics. 
I 
In other words, if we did not define the symbols that enter into 
the equations operationally it would be impossible to go f'rom !I 
I 
the theory to experimental situations. Thus, it would be im- I 
possible to verify a theory experimentally and the theory, 
though it be mathematically correct, could not claim to be 
lmowledge of anyth ing in the physical world. 
It would seem that the relations between symbols have more 11 
claim to reality than the particular names, the physical enti- I 
ties, which we associate with the symbols. Thus, Poincare is 
1 
led to say that 
these appellations were only i mages substituted for the 
real objects which nature will eternally hide from us. 
The true relations between these real objects are the 
only reality we can attain to, and -the only condition is 
that the same relations exist between these objects as ·· 
between the images by which we ~re forced to replace them. I 
': 
" Poincare's conventionalism makes a better account of the 
creative aspects of science which constitute a large part of 
li 36 
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of mathematical physics. If his views are, perhaps, more diffi~ 
'I 
cult to grasp than the views of the strict positivists, it is 11 
, 
1 probably because Poincare has dealt more directly with the sub-
tleties of scientific knowledge. 
5. Realism 
The position of the scientific realists with regard to 
scientific concepts is not as different from that of the modi-
fled positivists as might be expected. Both would probably 
agree on the basic structure of scientific conceptual schemes 
and the methods by which scientific progress is eru~anced. The 
difference between the two views is primarily one of interpretaf 
tions of the significance of 
1 
the concepts. ~j 
As Benjamin points out, the modified positivisms such as , 
I 
conventionalism look upon the Y~owing operations as essentially 
I inventive devices, while for the realists these operations 
I 
The resulting concepts .
1 
are thus, for the modified positivists, convenient or useful 
are essentially the tools of discovery. 
but do not necessarily represent existing physical entities, 
wh ile for the realists these concepts describe or correspond 
to actual physical structures. 
I 
I 
I 
I For Poincare the atom would be the name ascribed to certaiiJ 
entities in the conceptual scheme of physics. The concept of 
the atom has been created because it serves as a convenient and 
,I 
useful conceptual tool. We know it only through its relations \\ 
1 
with other atoms and other physical entities. It is the rela-
1. Benj amin, IPS, 149 
I 
! 
I __ I Jl 
tions only which really exist, the objects between which the 
I relations exist are unknowable. I Similarly, Poincare might 
I 
II 
I' 
II 
I! 
1: 
say that the electric field is an image of, a name for, a symbol 
which enters into certain equations in mathematical physics. 
To the realist, however, an atom is just as real as a 
table or a cell. He would not claim that the atom is precisel~1 
. II 
what our present state of physical knowledge says it is. But, 1 
he would say that science is in the process of discovering 
what constitutes an atom. The realist's point of view is clear~y 
stated by Planck: "Physics deals with the actual events, a.nf ~~ 
its object is to discover the laws which these events ·obey." 
As for the electric field, it too is real, and the mathematica~ 
2 
equations express the laws which it obeys. 
It is probable that neither the modified positivists nor 
the realists are entirely right in this dispute. One conclu-
sion can, perhaps, be drawn from the above discussion and that 
is that the problem of the reality of the world which science 
describes is not very different from the problem of the 
reality of the world which any kind of knowledge attempts to 
describe. It is difficult to understand how an atom or mole-
cule can be of a fundamentally differe~t nature than the more 
familiar objects of the external world. Thus, if the objects 
of scientific concepts are unknowable, then so must be the ob- 11 
. . I 
j ects of our impress ions of the more immediate external world. l
1 
1. Planck, POP, 17 
2. Einstein & Infeld, EOP, 148 
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And if it is held that the objects of our impressions of the 
external world are real, then such things as atoms and molecules 
I 
imust be equally real. This conclusion allows for both the 
realistic and modified positivistic views with regard to scien-
tific concepts. The solution to the basic problem can then res ~[ 
on more fundamental philosophical considerations. 1 
6. Rationalism. / 
The whole spirit of scientific investigation is so empir- I ) 
ical that it seems very unlikely that a completely rationalistic 
- 1 
view of scientific concepts could be reasonably defended. By Iii. 
j a rationalistic view we mean one in which the fundamental 1, 
principles of science are held to be derivable from the prin-
ciples of reason, independent of sense observations. The 
purpose of the present discussion is not to present such a 
system or anything approaching it but rather to point out cer-
l1 
[ tain rationalistic tendencies in existing views. 
I 
Although the strict positivists are too empirical to allow 1 
- ,, 
I any significant amount of rationalism, the modified positivists :, 
I leave room for a rationalistic element in their views. For 
I i example, in conventionalism the knowing operations are performed 
I upon the data by the mind according to consistent rules~ The~e [[ 
~~ operations are arbitrary in the sense that they need only to be 1: 
1 useful and convenient in dealing with scientific facts and are j I . 
not dictated by external circumstances. They must be applied, 
however, according to the rules which the mind recognizes as 
li intuitively reasonable, and are thus to some extent rationalis-
----11 
if 
I 
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I tic. But since none of the principles of science can be derived 
i 
1
1l L~ the absence of data by the mind alone, this view would not 
I admit of any a priori scientific knowledge. 
II 
1, Eddington's view of scientific knowledge is, perhaps, as 
I 
I strongly rationalistic as any modern view. This view, which he 
chooses to call selective subjectivism, seems innany respects 
to be a development and extension of conventionalism. 
Eddington defines physical knowledge as the knowledge gainl 
1 
ed by the methods of physical science, and the physical uni-
- 2 
I verse as the world described by physical knowledge. 
I 
we may 
I 
II 
II 
II 
' 
I 
I' 
II 
study the content of physical knowledge by the usual methods of 
science, and we may study the nature of physical knowledge by 
the practice of scientific epistemology. Eddington is par-
ticularly concerned with the latter aspect of physical knowl-
edge. 
For purposes of comparison, scientific epistemology might 
be considered as a study of the whole process of going from 
data through knowing operations to physical knowledge. The 
importance of the epistemological metnod is due to the fact 
I 
that "generalizations that can be reached epistemologically 
1
1 
have a security which is denied to those that can only be reachJ d 
empirically." 
3 
Thus, the rationalistic proc~dures of epistemol-,/j 
ogy can reveal a priori scientific knowledge. ' 
- I 
What is most significant in this view is the type of scienT 
tific knowledge that falls under the heading of a priori knowl-
I. Eddington, PPS, 2 11 
I! 2. Eddington, PPS 1 3 
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edge.that falls under the heading of a priori knowledge. I, 
Eddington takes the unique view that "all the laws of nature :
1 that are usually classed as fundame~tal can be foreseen wholly I 
from epistemological considerations. They correspond to a 
1 
priori knowledge, and are therefore whooly subjective." 
Unfortunately, Eddington's views are based upon a number 
I· 
:I 
ll 
I' 
I' 
of highly mathematical. derivations which are beyond the scope 
1 
' 2 - ' ; 
of this thesis. The brief presentation of his views, however, 
does suffice to show that there are reasons to believe that 
ration~listic procedures may play a much more significant part 
in the structure of scientific knowledge than is commonly held: !j 
I 
I 
1~ Eddington, PPS, 57 
2. It is interesting to note that, although to my knowledge no 
fundamental mathematical errors have been found in Edding-
ton's work, his views have not received much serious atten-
tion from professional scientific circles. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY 
1. The Problem of' Causality. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss some of the 
aspects of the age old problem of causality. A more comprehen-
sive treatment of the problems of the philosophy of science 
should give a detailed discussion of most of the fundamental 
I 
concepts of science such as, for example, space, time, and 
energy. The concept of causality has been selected for discus-
sion because it is fundamental to both science and philosophy 
in general. Then too, there has been a considerable review of' 
the whole problem of' causality in the light of the discoveries 
not only among philosophers, but among . the foremost scientists, 
as to the full significance of modern physical theory. In view 
lof this fact, it is extremely hazardous, and perhaps completely 
unwarranted, to say that any ph ilosophical position on the prob- 1 
lem of causality, or any other problem for that matter, is re- I 
futed or validated on the basis of t he findings of modern physi-
cal science. At the same time, there is considerable agreement 
====.==i~~=======--=-=---~--~==================~--=·=-=~======:1-~1~--~~ 
! 
I 
I 
I 
among scientists and philosophers regarding certain aspects of 
1 
modern physical knowledge which makes certain views virtually 
untenable. In the discussion ofany aspect or application of 
modern physical knowledge it is important to bear in mind the 
relative certainty of the knowledge or interpretation that is 
involved. 
uncritical thought 
effect. The cause of a 
commonly associates a cause with every 11 
given event precedes that event and the l1 
IJ 
occurrence of the conditions which define the cause makes it 
possible to predict the associated effect. It was commonly 
held that given the cause the effect must follow by necessity. 
But rrume pointed out, and science has since agreed, that it is 
impossible to observe any connection, much less any necessary 
connection between cause and effect. 
Thus, we would be lead to believe that there is no good 
reason for our faith in the uniformity of nature. From this 
point of view the problem of causality is to find sufficient 
reason for belief in the observed uniformity of nature. 
I! 
I 
Hume did not deny phenomenal causation. For hL~ the cause j 
effect relationship was a property which we tend to bestow on I 
certain groups of contiguous or successive events. By this act 
we are able to gain much practical knowledge of matters of fact 
But he does deny the cause-effect relationship any ontological 
reality since it is impossible to observe any necessary connec-
tion between a cause and its effect. 
Kant attempted to construct a theory of causation that 
~ I 
woul!d 
42 
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I! _ I ~======~ answer the difficulties and uncertainties that Hume had raise~~ 
in his treatment of the problem. Kant agreed with Hume that thi 
II 
cause-effect relationship was something bestowed by the mind on
1
1 
certain groups of events. Unlike Hume, however, Kant believed 1 
that the cause-effect relationship was a necessary connection, 
at least on the phenomenal level. He did not mean that once 
we had learned the effect of a certain cause we could always 
predict the occurrence of the effect, given the cause. What he ii 
meant was that every effect must have a cause, and every cause I 
must have some effect, even if we could never predict what thad 
!I 
would be with certainty. II 
There is no unique solution to the problem of causality. 
The discussion centers around the formulation of a meaningful 
concept of causality. This in itself clears up many of the 
difficulties surrounding the problem. 
2. The Formulation of the Concept. 
A common statement of the principle of causality takes 
the form: The same causes produce the same effects. This no-
tion of causality has been recognized by thinkers for centuries. 
. I 
The same notion is often used today in uncritical thinking. 1 
\1-hen the concept of causality becomes a crucial issue, as it 
does in science or philosophy, a more critical formulation of 
it is necessary. For nit is found that physics knows of no 
law connecting cause and effect; indeed, there is no plausible 
. 1 
11 way of defining these concepts. rr 
II 
1. Lindsay and Margenau, FOP, 517 
i! 
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For example, when two billiard balls, A and B, approach 
each other, collide, and then move apart, we 
change of mo~ion of the two balls was caused 
might say that the l 
by the force actin 
between them. In this case the force would be the cause, the 
change of motion the effect, in this sequence of ever.m. The 
concept of causality as formulated above would lead us to say 
that the same force acting between the balls at any other time 
would produce the same effect; namely the same change in the 
motion of the two balls. However, we do not actually observe a 
force acting between the balls during the collision; we postu-
late the existence of a force upon observing the change in mo-
I 
tion that takes place. The assumed force, the causal agent, is 
thus unobserved. Furthermore it is unnecessary since the entire 
rl 
event could be accurately described by simply describing the li 
complete motion of the balls. 
To conclude from this example that since the causal agent 
is unobservable and unnecessary for the description, that the 
II 
I 
, principle of causality could not be applied to this case would, j 
! of course, be unjustified. vVhat the example does show is that I 
I I j the formulation of the concept of causality given above is not I~ 
I
' adequate. J 
1 
Science has attempted to .formulate the concept of' causali t I, 
1l in such a way as to avoid the use of the terms "cause" and "efrJct" 
li as properties of events. It is usually the case that a physica~ 
11 event is at the same time the effect of some cause and the 
I 
I 
i cause of a further ef.fect. In many cases there is a continuous 
I 
I 
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II 
1 
I 
I chain of events so that it is difficult to separate cause and '! 
i effect. At the same time, the attempt has been to speak of ,, 
I
I causality only on the phenomenological level, and avoid reference 
I II to ontological causal agents. Although this may be inadequate 1 
J[ as a complete philosophical position, it is in the spirit of 
I! sound scientific method. 
Laplace expressed the essence of the classical concept of 
causality when he maintained that a sufficient intelligenc-e, 
knowing the positions and velocities of an the masses in the 
universe at a given i nstant, could reconstruct the past and pre-
1! 
diet the future with complete accuracy. This statement is 1: 
clear and meaningful since all the terms used are well defined 11 
physical concepts. ~t is not _ a satisfactory formulation of the li 
concept of causality, however, since the essence of causality I
I 
,I 
put in this way seems to depend on the ab~lity of some "intel- I 
ligence" to be able to predict the future. The ability of the 
scientist to predict has been of fundamental importence to the 
development of science, but it is misleading as the essence of 
causality. If the universe were governed by the arbitrary whims 
. II 
of Descartes' demon causality could hardly be said to exist. 
would causality be restored if the demon informed us in advance j 
of' his irregular plans, and thus enabled us to "predict" the 'I 
future? The point is that causality is, in a sense, independen~ 
. 'I 
of man's ability to predict. This view is in opposition to the 
positivistic one which maintains that causality has meaning 
only when defined in terms of the operations necessary to 
1 
verify a given prediction. 
sidered. 
The formalism of physics makes it possible to define an 
I 
equivalent but somewhat more precise concept of causality. The ! 
I 
state of a physical system is, or is represented by, a function , 
of certain variables. To say that a given st~tte A is always 
followed by another state 
I 
B is equivalent to stating that there 1' 
I exists an invariable relation between a series of changing 
~ ' 
states. This relation is expressed mathematically, usually as 
I 
1 a differential equation. It seems that what is meant by caus-
ality in this context is that the relation between successive 
states will not be affected by the passage of time. Time may, 
o~ course, be one of the fariables in the function describing 
a state but only as an interval of time, never as an absolute 
I 
il 
I; 
I 
li 
1: 
j; 
I 
I 
I 
value. In other words, cauwality may be 
II differential equations in terms of which 
said to exist if "the I 
II 
1' ----
nature is described do I' 
II 
' 1. This point is ~ discussed at g-reater length in Lindsay and 
M~g~ana~ F0~,=*5~~7~-~5~22~·==================================~ 
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1 
not contain explicit functions of the time." 
There is a vagueness in this formulation due to the fact 
that nothing has been said about what particular variables 
should be chosen to represent a st~e. This amounts to the 
II 
II 
I 
same vagueness that was found in the earlier formulation of the l 
concept of causality due to the lack of definition of the term i 
"state". 
Either of these formulat:tons of the concept of causality 
may be accepted as a starting point in the discussion of the 
meaning of the concept, providing that some assertion is made 
as to how the term "state" shall be defined in the par ticular 
area being considered. 
3. The Meaning of the Concept. 
A glance at the concept of causality as it appeared in 
classical physics reveals · some important facts about the n1eanin 1 
of the concept. In this . concept the position and momentum of a 
particle at a given time define the state of that particle at 
that tinle. The state of any larger system can then be defined 
as the sum of the states of the particles that make up the 
larger system. From the knowledge of the particular state of a 
system at a given time it is then possible to calculate the 
state that the system will have at any later t~e. The laws o~ 
physics, then, were held to 
mation, at least, the rigid 
describe to a high degree of appro~~ 
laws of nature which determined the I, 
! motions of every particle. 
I 
This rigid determination is the 
11 -~----Ji l. Lindsay and Margenau, FOP, 522. 
~ 
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I 
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I 
I 
1l essence o:f the classical concept of causality. 
II 
'I 1, 
I 
il 
'I Causality, according to this view, is universal , I And yet, I 
no one could hope, even before modern physics challenged the II 
class leal concept of causality, ever to be able to veri:fy t h is ,, 
!concept empirically. The concept of causality has to be applied 
in practice to smaller areas, where there is a possibility o:f 
:factors which seem to be necessary to describe the sequence. 
IThe area is thus defined by the number o:f factors which are to 
be considered in attacking the problem at hand. The size o:f 
the area, that is, the number of factors taken into account, 
lis determined usually by the accuracy o:f the measuring tech-
niques which are to be employed in testing the theory. When a 
system .has been properly isolated it may be called a closed 
system. 
I If we examine the method used in determining whether or 
I 
!not a given system has been properly isolated we are led back 
again to the concept of causality. The common method of deter-
i. 
I 
I 
I 
I' 
' I. 
II 
i! 
d 
II 
I 
·, mining whether or not a system has been properly isolated is to 
!see if the theoretical description of the system corresponds I 
with the sequence of events that actually take place in the 11 
____ jr ystem within :he -limits 0~- ex~:rimental accuracy. u _ theory j' 
48 
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checks with experiment then the theory is temporarily assumed 
be correct and the system is assumed to be a closed one. How-
~r-----
to 
eve~, if there is a discrepancy then either the theory is not 
correct or else the system that is being considered is not 
closed. If the investigation is being carried on in an area 
where the existing theory has previously been reliable then 
the chances are that the reason for the discrepancy can be 
found in the fact that the system under consideration has not 
II 
II 
'I I 
, be en properly isola ted. In other words , some fact or is assumed II 
I to be existent in the physical world which has not been accounted 
for in the definition of the state of the system unde.r investi- 1 
gation. If the theory is correct and the system is expanded I 
conceptually to include the extra factor, then the discrepancy I 
between t heory and experiment usually vanishes, or is at least 
greatly reduced. It is then possible to say that a given state 
A is always followed by the same state B, or, in other words, 
the physical system under consideration is causally connected. 
But science can deal only with causal situations. If a. 
given state is not always followed by the same state the only 
hope of gaining a. scientific description of the system is to 
I! 
redefine the state i n such a way that the new definition includes 
. I' all of the si gnificant causal factors. This amounts to closing ; 
- I 
or isolating the system. !1 
It was said above that in order to verify the concept of I 
causality it is necessary to isolate or close a given physical II 
system. But now it seems that the definition of a closed system 
~====·-b!!.~~--~---~~~~~=====================· J~fl====== 
I 
I 
II 
I 
-~---==~r 
involves its being a causally connected system. In other words~~ 
science will always verify the existence of causal relations in
1 
the physical world because it can only deal with closed or 
causal systems. If there are failures of the causality princip~e, 
II 
then they could never be revealed by the structure or content 
'1 
of scientific ¥~owledge. 
This conclusion can be reached by a slightly different 
line of reasoning. We may look upon scientific knowledge in 
II 
II 
It 
I 
i 
its highest form as consisting of a group of mathematical equa- 1 
tions. These equations express relations between a grouP, of 1 
symbols. Of course, the relations themselves and any valid :~ 
1 deductions that can be drawn from them are true, mathematically .1 
I ~~ 
, speaking, as long as we do not violate any rules of logic, and 
this truth is independent of time. In o~der to say that the 
relations and the symbols are descriptive of, or represent, 
i 
1 
physical evmt s and physical entities, the scientist must selec~· 
aspects of his experience which have the uniformity and time 
I independence (in the absolute sense) are exactly what we 
demand of, and mean by, causality in the phys i cal world. Thus, 
1 science can deal only with causal systems; a failure of the 
1 causality principle could never be revealed by the structure 
I and content of scientific knowledge. 
The objection may be raised that these conclusions are not I 
compatible with the discoveries of modern physics; the laws of 
physics have only statistical validity; the "uncertainty prin-
1. Margenau, Art. (1934). 1. 
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The re----~~ 1! ciple" destroys the concept of causality in physics. 
i 
maining part of this section will attempt to answer these ob- 1 
jections as they apply to the concept of causality in modern 
physical thought. The final section of this chapter will then 
discuss the question of whether or not this concept is des-
criptive of physical reality. 
li 
'I 
I 
The significance of modern physics in its effect on the 
concept of causality can be seen by a brief review of the revo- 1 
lution in thought that took place. The classical concept of 
causality, characterized by Laplace's formulation, defined the 
state of a physical system in terms of the positions and velo-
cities of the particles composing the system. Now this concept i 
was not destroyed at a single blow. Over a period of a quarter I 
of a century or more physicists found it necessary to resort 
to statistical laws and probability relations in order to ob-
tain results in the theory t hat could be checked experimentally,. 
But when the uncertainty princip~e was al?llounced the classical \1
1 concept was dealt a serious blow. This principle was not a 
practical limitations, but rather a theoretical limitation on 
precision in measuring the position and veloc~ of a particle. 
On the atomic scale this limitation is serious enough to make . 
it impossible to formulate a c ausal description of atomic e~ent l 
I 
in terms of the classical concept of causality. The conclu~ion t 
would seem to be that physics could enuncia.te only statistical 
laws in describing atomic phenomena; causality in the strict 
sense seemed to be non-existent for the single minute particle. il 
====~!==-=-==~===========================================================================~----=-=-=-=-~~-~==41·================== 
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These conclusions, however, are not justified by the I 
I 
facts that were uncovered in modern physics. The uncertainty jj 
II principle denies the validity of the classical formulation of 
the concept of causality, not the possibility of any concept I 
I 
of causality. What is called for, then, is a reformulation of j: 
the concept of causality. The great success of the new quantum! 
mechanics was that it was able to reformulate the concept of 
causality in such a way as to restore the causal character of 
1 
the analysis of physical systems. 
An accurate description of this reformulation is beyond 
the acope of this thesis. Briefly, it consists of redefining 
the state of a physical system, and enunciating certain mathe-
matical procedures which will yield information that can be 
verified experimentally. Quantum mechanics not only describes I: 
the observed uniformities on the atomic scale, but also possesses 
II 
the necessary characteristic that when applied to areas where ! 
the classical physics is highly successful gives an equivalent 
description. 
The price paid for the restoration of causality to physi-
cal description is the higher level of abxtraction found in 
modern physical theories. In general, these theories tell us 
in a determinate way the probability that a given event will 
take place at a given time and in a given place. The only way 1/ 
that we have of verifying such a probability is to make a lnrge /1 
number of observations, or deal with a large number of events 
52 
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statistical 
'I 
The uncertainty principle states that the position and 
momentum of a particle cannot be simultaneously measured with 
complete accuracy. Since the classical definition of the state j 
of a particle is completely determined by the position and 
momentum of the particle, this principle means that we can no 
longer define the state of a particle according to the classi-
I 
!j 
cal definition with complete accuracy. This forces us to aban-
1 
don the classical concept of causality. It is possible to re- 11 
tain the concept of causality by incorporating the concept of j 
probability in physical theory. Or to put it another way, the I 
I' probability of the occurrence of a single event seems to be the J 
only determinate aspect of the event and therefore the concept I 
of causality must be basad in some way on that probability. 
4. Deterrainism versus Indeterminism. 
The controversy between the determinists and the indeter-
minists is one which has arisen out of the discovery of the 
uncertainty princip~e in modern physics. II Of course, long beforl 
t h is principle was formulated philosophers had taken sides in I 
the controversy, particularly as it had referance to the exist- ~ 
I ence or non-existenc e of free will. What is to be discussed in 
1
1 
this section, h owever, is not the broad philosophical question, 
but rather, the direct interpretation of a specific scientific 
principle, namely the uncertainty principle. . !I 
For the purposes 
--- ___ I -
of' this discussion the -~cer~inty prin-J'"'I ~==~~ 
----- I 
I 
I 
I 
I ~~~I~ 
1 ciple states that there is a theoretical limit to the accuracy 
with which certain pairs of related quantities may be measured ' 
simultaneously; position and momentum are one such pair of 
quantities. The controversy arises in the interpretation of 
this statement: Is it an uncertainty due to the nature of 
man's techniques of observation? Or, is it an uncertainty due 
to a certain lack of definiteness in the very structure of the I' 
physical world? 
The determinist holds that the uncertainty principle is a 
limitation on man's ability to measure and does not mean at all li 
1 
that there is an indeterminacy of cause in the physical universe. 
I It is one thing, he would say, to assert that a particle has a 1
1 
definite position and momentum at every instant which we ~ay ! 
I I not be capable of measuring with complete accuracy, but to say 
1 
that a particle does not have a unique position and momentum at ~~ 
any time is to challenge the principles of reasonable thought. II 
II· Planck and Einstein are of the opinion that the uncertainty in II 
li 
II 
I j The indeterminist, on the other hand, holds that the uncer-
tainty principle informs us of an actual indeterminateness or I 
vagueness in the structure of the physical world.
2 
The concept ~~ 
of strict causal law operating in the physical world must be I 
abandoned because the only theory that has been successful in 
lj 2. 
Hoare, Art. (1932), . 394-403; Metcalf, Art. (1935), 78-99. 
Compton, FO:M, 7, 40; Eddington, NPW, 225. 
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1 taken as its starting point the non-existence of such strict 
I' 
causality; it is impossible to define the physical operations i: 
that would be necessary to measure an exact position and mo:men_ll, 
tum sLmultaneously. The indeterminist's position is based on 
the operational point of view' and it rejects the classical con-'1 
cept of causality. However, it would not deny the concept of I 
causality as quantum mechanics has formulated it. 
There is no unique solution to this problem based on the 
scientific content of the uncertainty principle. I; Both the deter-
! 
minist and the indeterminst positions must be based on more 
I 
A 
This chapter has attempted to general philosophical views. 
examine the concept of causality with particular emphasis on 
I 
its meaning in the physical sciences. The next chapter, center~ 
ing around the problem of free will, will attempt to discuss 
some of the broader implications of the concept of causality 
more from the philosophical point of view. 
II 
I 
I 
-- !l 
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CHAPTER VI 
SCIENCE AND FREE WILL 
1. The Problem 
The problem of free will, that is, its existence and 
nature, is one of the deepest problems of philosophy. It must 
be stressed at once that the problem lies, for the most part, 
in the area of speculative philosophy, and therefore ·it will 
l 
I 
not, and perhaps may never, admit of a final and definite s olu- 11 
· tion. As in any problem of speculative philosophy, we must 
II 
examine all the facts and theories that are relevant to the prob-
il lem and seek the most reasonable solution. 
One of the greatest difficulties in arriving at a conclu-
sion as to the validity of the various solutions to the problem 
. . II 
the fact that the necessary terminology used in ,i in question is 
. I 
discussing the problem lacks clear and consistent definition as [ 
the various solutions are examined. It is one thing to say 
that free will exists; the real difficulty lies in describing 
and defining just what is meant by free will. 
Anoth er great hindrance to a reasonable solution to the 
problem lies in t he fact t hat emotions are aroused very easily 
in supporting one view or another. The proponents of free will 
cry out that if man is nothing more than a product of cosmic 
I 
forces then morality and ethics are meaningless. The proponents 
I 
reply that if the demon of free will is admitted J of _determinism 
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I 
preconceived metaphysical system, theology, or world view. 
result of this is that many metaphysical problems are frankly 
ignored. Thus, in order to be fair to all sides it will be 
necessary to assume the existence of both matter and mind as 
metaphysical entities, and allow for the possibility of their 
mutual inter-action. 
most reasonable. 
2. Universal Determinism. 
The view which holds that all physical and psychic states 
II 
and events take place as they do by necessity according to the li 
laws of nature will be called universal determinism. It is cal~ -
1 
I 
another 
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1 ed universal in order to distinguish this view fr?m 
ll:orm of determinism which will be discussed later. 
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ally, the view of universal determinism has been arrived at I' 
from two quite different considerations: materialistic mech-
.1 
anism, and pantheism. I 
The position of materialistic mechanism may be simply sta-
1
1 
ted as follows: The universe is composed of matter and motion. 11 
Mind is either nothing more than matter and motion, or it is a li 
by-product of a material state. The motion of the particles 11 
of matter is strictly det ermined by the causal laws which 11 
physics has discovered. In other words, all physical and psy- ,, 
chic states are strictly determined by causal law. This view 
is obviously a universal determinism and allows no possibility 
for the existence of free will. 
one critic ism of this formulation of the view of uni versall 
determinism is in order. The refutation of free will is based J' 
on a metaphysical position regarding the nature of reality: to ! 
deny mind is to deny any kind of free will. 
The pantheistic formulation of univerSjal determinism, made ! 
famous by Spinoza, can be simply stated as f .ollows: Everythingi! 
in the universe is part of the existence of God. God is per-
feet and omnipotent. Therefore, every contingent event and 
being follows from the nature of God by necessity. Once again 
the result is universal determinism. 
'I 
I 
The same criticism is in order: In the pantheistic formu- 11 
- I 
lation universal determinism follows necessarily from a pre con-
ceived notion of the nature of the universe. 
In order to avoid these criticisms universal determinism 
I! 
i 
i 
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I. 
!must be formulated in such a way that the metaphysical presup- 1 
positions can be avoided. That formulation can be just the def-
inition that was stated above in connection with the concept of 
icausality. If the causal state of a system, in other words, that 
aspect or representation of a system that is causal, can be saidli 
I 
'! to -completely represent the system, whether it be physical or 
il 
:mental or a combination of both, then the system is completely II 
1
determined by causal law. This formulation expresses the essence ! 
lor the complete 
!without denying 
determinism found in materialistic mechanism 
the possibility of the existence of mental 
states and their interaction with physical states. The evidence 
,to support this view is usually drawn from the results of sci-
![ence. 
In studying the physical world man has seen the uniformity 
of nature and has discovered many causal laws which govern, that 
I 
II is, determine, the state of the physical world. Without this 
~niformity and causality in the physical world science wo"J.J.ld be 1
1
! 
d 
:! impossible. In the biological, social, and psychological science ~ 
!similar uniformities are found and it is possible to formulate 
1
causal laws with a certain degree of accuracy by means of which ' 
it is possible to predict such things as biological growth and 
human behavior. If human behavior were not governed by causal 
I 
'law, that is, i f there were no uniformities in human behavior, 
I • 
interpersonal relations would result in unspeakable misery. In-
telligent action is dependent on the ability to predict. 
Most thinkers would have to a&nit the truth of the above 
I 
I 
I 
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The point 
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of disagree- :1 
ment is this: The proponents of universal determinism hold I 
' 
I' 
,, 
that even though we . do not know all of the causal laws at the 
present time, and perhaps may never know them with complete 
exactitude, the causal laws, nevertheless, exist and determine 
every event or · state of a physical or mental system. 
I 
The op- !I 
ponents of this view hold that the inaccuracy of causal laws in 
predicting exactly the course of events is due not only to the !II 
inadequateness of our present knowledge, but also to the fact 
that there is such a thing as an event or state that is not 
completely caused or determined by external conditions. From I 
I I 
the point of view of objective knowledge such an event or state 1 
I 
is indeterminate and could never be described by a completely 
causal law, and, thus, could never be predicted. Any view 
which supports the reality of free will must allow at least 
an element of indeterminism of this sort. 
One argmnent that is often used to refute Universal deter- ~! 
minism is that if this view is true then ethics and morality I 
are meaningless. If man is compelled by a necessary causality I 
I' 
II 
to do everything that he does, then it is absurd to say that 
man "ought" to do this or that, or that this action is good 
while another one is bad. This is not a legitimate argument 
against universal determinism, the fallacy being that it does II 
not carry out the implications of universal determinism to the 'I 
full extent. The point is this, that man does feel moral ob-
ligations and does experience value but these experiences are I 
li 
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!mined by all of the past experiences and hereditary influences 
I in his life. This could be explained in more detail in psycho-
logical terms, conditioning , needs, association of ideas, inte-
gration, biological factors, and so on; the point is that the 
individual, everyt~ng he thinks and does, is the result of 
causal necessity external to himself. Universal determinism 
man investigator could never know the difference since he is 
!always bound in the sequence of necessary events and could not 
1· know anything about his situation in that chain in any real 
1: 
,I 
II 
I 
sense. I 
The teleologist claims that man is not merely determined b1 i 
his past but to a large extent by what he wants to be; that is, 11 
I by the future. This claim as it stands is open to a possible , 
criticism. A future event cannot be the cause of a present 
state: it is the expectation of a future event which, if any-
thing, affects the present state. The expectation is a present 
1l experience and adds to the other causal factors in determining 
r,i the behavior of the individual. 
I , ll The position of universal determinism would se em, from thisl. , 
--~~-~1========lP=== 
I 
to be fairly strong. Ultimately, it is, perhaps, impossible on ! 
the basis of our present lmowledge to logically refute the view l 
of universal determinism. But, can this view offer anything 1 
other than a negation of human freedom? This question will now 11 
be examined. 
The older forms of universal determinism found in the 
thought of the Stoics, Spinoza, and to a great extent in Orien- 11 
tal philosophy claim that if a man can just realize the deter- I! 
1: 
ministic nature of the universe, he will see how futile it ls t0 
struggle against the inevitable and accept the events of his 
life, no matter how painful they may be, with a spiritual pas-
1 
sivity which will give true inner peace. This, however, is im- f 
possible by definition in a completely deterministic universe. 
If a man realizes the deterministic nature of the universe it 
is only because he has been externally forced to do so, and he 
has no "choice" as to whether ~"he will accept his fate or 
struggle against it. Indeed, if a man rejects universal 
determinism and supports a view of free will, it is because 
the causal forces in his life have force d him to this conclu-
sion. Again, he has had no choice. ,1 
The more recent forms of determinism claim that this view ~~ 
offers real hope for the success of science in · the fields of ~~~ 
sociology and psychology. In other words, if the universe is f. 
I 
strictly causal, then science can discover the laws describing 
this causality in all areas as it has so successfully in the 
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1; area of physical events. If the determinism is uni versal and 
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complete, then it is rather foolish even to wonder whether 
science will be successful in any field since its success or 
failure is guaranteed by causal necessity. But we cannot make 
the mistake of saying that it is foolish to be concerned about 
the success of cience, since, every attitude we have has been 
causally determined and we have no choice as to whether or not 
we shall be concerned. 
i 
If there is no such t~~ng as free will; that is, if the 1 
view of universal determinism is the truth, the result seems to ·j 
I 
be that man will go on doing things just as he did before. Thi ~ 
view, then, can be rejected (if not refuted) on the ground that il 
the acceptance of it (universal determinism) cannot make the I 
I 
I 
slightest difference one way or another. Even the words nrejec~ " 
or "accept 11 are not strictly legitimate without a person who carl 
II 
(by his own freedom) "reject" or "accept". !1 
It seems almost impossible to avoid some hypothesis which I
I 
will allow for some degree of human _freedom. The task at hand, 
,· 
then, is to examine some of the hypotheses 
human freedom and seek that one which will 
able account of the facts of experience. 
which will allow for ·I 
give the most reasonl 
I 
I 
3. Indeterminism. 
In order to account for free will it seems necessary to 
find a break in the strict causality of universal determinism. 
Almost any recent argument for free will cites the uncertainty 
principle as the required break in causality. If we grantthe 
indeterministic interpretation of the uncertainty principle, 
I 
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,I 
1 namely that causality in the physical world is not complete, 
then it is, perhaps, possible to say that a conscious mental 
state could affect a physica.l .state without violating any of 
laws of the physical universe. 
I 
th~ 
I 
I 
This hypothesis has the advantage that it offers a start-
ing point for a doctrine of free will that is in harmony with 
I 
However, it is 1 our present knowledge of the physical universe. 
'! not the only possible interpretation of the uncertainty prin-
:j . 
tl ciple, as was seen above, nor is it the only possible starting 
!I point for a doctrine of free will consistent with the knowledge ! 
of the physical universe. 
It would be possible to take the alternate interpretation 
li I 
I 
of the uncertainty principle, that the physical universe is com4 
1 
pletely causal despite our inability to veri~ this causality: I 
! without necessarily giV:ing up the hypothesis of free will. In 
other words, it could be said that the strict laws of the 
physical world are valid only when applied to the physical 
world. Conscious mental states can affect physical states 
without violating any of the laws of physics since physics does 1. 
not pretend to be able to describe such interactions. 
For the purposes of this discussion it does not matter 
which of these two points of view be accepted. Either view 
I 
I allows us to make the hypothesis that I . . . mental states can affect 
:; physical states without violating any of the kno\vn laws of phy-
I 
i sics. This hypothesis seems to be necessary if we are to estabi 
II 
'I lish a reasonable doctrine of free will • 
.. 
I 
I 
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I 
Although this hypothesis is a necessary condition it is bt l 
no means a sufficient condition for the existence of free will. 
II 
If conscious mental states are completely determined by stimuli!, 
memory of past experience, and inherited chara.cters, then there 
could be no such thing as free will, even though these mental 
states could affect physical states. A second condition for the 
existence of free will, then, is that there be a certain amount JJ 
In other words, there must II 'I of indeterminacy in mental states. 
be indeterminate situations in the mental states of individuals• 
I 
' Again, this does not mean that we must also hold to the principle 
I 
of indeterminacy in the physical world. 
The possibility of mental states affecting physical 
and an element of indeterminacy in mental states seem to 
states 1
1 
be the l: 
some basic hypotheses that must be made in order to establish 
basis for free will. However, to believe that indeterminacy 
can account for free will is to believe that a certain random-
ness or chaos can give rise to an experience of freedom. A , 
more positive doctrine of free will is demanded by the facts of 
1 will. 
4. Self-determinism. 
Perhaps the whole difficulty in establishing a firm sup-
port for free will lies in. the confusion resulti ng from the 
transference of the methods and terminology of the physical 
sciences into the realm of psychology and sociology, with out a 
"11 
I 
I 
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clear and explicit recognition of the limitations involved. 
The physical sciences deal with material objects and pro-
cesses in the sense that they are external to, and independent 
1 
of conscious states. The principle of causality has been so 
successful in interpreting the events of nature that there is 
every reason to believe that the physical universe is governed 
' largely by cosmic laws. On the other hand, there is no reason 
·: . I 
to suppose that this same prin~iple will have any meaning what- ~-
soever when applied to the area of conscious events. 
But the formulation of the principle of causality adopted 
above does not presuppose the study of material external states l 
- I 
Once again, the validity of the principle of causality depends 1 
- . I 
entirely on :the definition of the term 11 state". If a meaningful 
1.- - I 
' and accurate definition of "state" can be found in the area of -I 
.: conscious events, _ then there is some ju~tification for applying · 
the principle of causality in this area. The verification of 
1 the principle would then consist in actually ob ~ erving the 
fact that state A is always followed by state B. Let us exam-
ine each of these two necessary steps separately. 
. -
It must be admitted that psychology as a science has been 
unable to discover any set of measurable entities whose quanti- I 
I' tative variation could uniquely describe any given conscious II 
1 
state. Strictly speaking, an adequate definition of a consciousl 
- II 
state must be no less than the personal experience of that stat1 
I 
' 
in the i~~ediate present. 
I 
66 
" 1. The metaphysical considerations involved here cannot be i 
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Fur:thermore, in the area of conscious experience, strictly Ji 
'I 
speaking, every conscious state is unique since it builds upon i1 
It 
l and remembers previous conscious states. It would seem from this 
1 that the principle of causality is undefinable and unverifiable 11 
i! . 
1 1.n the area of conscious experience. But this argument does not I[ 
1
mean that there is no causal connection between conscious states ; 
I I 
1 it means that the rigorous procedure necessary to verify strict 
causality in conscious states cannot be applied in that area 
I 
:simply because that strict causality does not exist. 
!I 
Several flurther considerations will lead to a more meaning-
I 
ful doctrine of freedom in conscious experience. In the first 
place, psychology has discovered many methods of measurement 
lwhich give in some cases fairly accurate quantitative data, and 
'in many cases give at least a qualitative description. The under! 
!lying faith of psychology is that these methods of measurement 
and description will be constantly improved with the future 
'I 
1development of that science. This improvement must not only be 
1admitted, it must be earnestly hoped for. But it must also be 
admitted that this measurement and description will never be 
1 
mathematically rigorous for the whole area of conscious exper-
ience. 
Secondly, it must be admitted that despite the ultimate 
'Uniqueness of each conscious state there is a large amount of 
I 
uniformity in conscious experience. Without this uniformity, 
,that is, if each conscious experience represented a completely 
new situation, human experience would be an utter confusion, 
===============~=~----·------ ~~~~~ 
I 
II 
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which it certainly is not. It is this uniformity in experi~:::~1~ .j '! that offers the justification for applying the principle of 
1
1 
1causali ty in the area of conscious experience. In other words, 11 
:psychologically equivalent states do occur, even though they are 11 
!not strictly identical. Science can discover those factors which ;! 
are involved in equivalent conscious states, and then, by apply- !I 
ling the principle of causality in this limited sense, seek an 
I 
!objective and intelligible understanding of human behavior. 
I 
Evidence of the initial success of this method is to be found in ,J 
·! the intelligent understanding of many aspects of human behavior ~~-
1 1~. lsuch as reflex action, conditioned response, habit foffaation, 
neurotic conditions, and so on. In each of these cases, it is 
I 
,found that one factor, or a small number of factors, completely 
dominate the conscious state, so that they may be considered 
1equivalent and thus eligible for scientific study. The fact that 
r 
II 
II 
I! 
I 
I 
the causal laws established by this procedure are constantly 
subject to exception does not invalidate the causal laws; it I 
simply means that in many cases an additional factor (or factors ~ ~ 
enters into the conscious state to such an extent that the con- 1l 
h itions assumed for the operation of the causal law are no 
- II 
longe, 
:I 
present. 
For example, in the case of a common reflex action exper-
lienced when the hand comes in contact with a hot object the 
above point is illustrated. The initial conscious state may be 
! 
I 
i 
II 
II 
roughly described as a localized-heat-pain-experience, the succ- ' 
eeding state as muscular-jerk-movement experience. The single 
68 
, factor is so intense that the unique factors in the state are 
I completely insignificant. Since the experience is a common one 
it may be scientifically studied and a causal law may be estab-
I 
I 
f lished that will describe the succession of events. But, there 
:: are a considerable number of instances in which the hand grasps 
'[ a hot object and despite the experience of heat and pain contin-:1 
ues to hang on to the object. It might be said that the occur- [: 
renee of exceptions such as this show that the causal law estab- l 
'l lished above is not valid in many cases. But this assertion 
,i overlooks the fact that a new factor is significant in the ini-
1 tial state, namely a conscious willing effort to hang on despi te1 
1
the pain. Since this is not equivalent to the initial state f 
I 
assumed for the operation of the causal law, the causal law doesl1 
fnot even apply to this situation and cannot be said to be inval-
' idated by its failure to describe the subsequent succession of 
events. This simply amounts to the assertion made earlier that 
science is based upon the principle of causality and cannot ver-
I 
l ify anything but causal relations. 
I 
One further consideration is necessary in order to bring to il 
light the significance of freedom in human experience. It was 
jseen in the physical sciences that an application of the prin-
ciple of causality led to a formulation of causal laws which 
lcould be verified by observation. It is usually assumed, then, 
', that there actually e .xists in that which is studied some govern-
1
! 
I 
ing principles of which the causal laws are an intelligent rep- 1 
resentation; these governing principles are commonly called laws l 
69 
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-r I of nature in the physical world. 
If the principle of causality finds successful application ! 
1 in the study of conscious states, the governing principles must 
1
1 
be assumed to exist, likewise, in that which is being studied; : 
namely the mind of the indi vidu~l. Here lies the mistake of thl 
complete determinist: Impressed by the success which the prin- li 
ciple of causality meets in studying human behavior, he makes I, 
the mistake of supposing that the governing princ;ples described 
' by this study exist as part of the laws of nature. 
The causality that is discovered in the study of the in-
dividual human mind can only intelligently be supposed to exist · 
in the individual human mind, and may be quite distinct from 
' the laws of nature. The essence of human freedom, then, is 
I· 
that the self determines, to some extent at least, the uniformi i 
ties in conscious states which science seeks to discover. We I! 
must add to the two hypotheses already given the hypothesis 
that the individual possesses the power to introduce into an 
I 
,, 
indeterminate situation factors sufficient to make that situa- I 
' tion causal. 
I 
I 
This discussioim does not claim to present a "solution" to I 
the problem of free will. The third hypot hesis made above is 
I 
really a statement with out proof that· there is such a thing as I 
free will. The attempt has been to formulate a concept of free ~ 
dom in human experience that is not inconsistent with the find- I 
ings of science in all fields, and that offers a reasonable 
:I 
adcount of the subjective experience of freedom. 
70 
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r-il The extent to which the self is able to determine its -r==-~ 
ovm uniformities is not evident from the above discussion be-
cause it has not dealt explicitly .with the efi'ect of physical 
states on conscious mental states. In other words, we must 
form some idea of the extent to which heredit~ and environment 
determine the conscious states of individuals. 
The determination of uniformities by the self is not an 
arbitrary procedure. Each individual is endowed with certain 
I 
!I 
:I 
I 
I 
basic abilities and certain basic drives at birth, in addition 11 
il Differences in opinion r 
as to exactly what is inherited and what is acquired by early 1! 
to his particular physical structure. 
environmental influences cannot be discussed here. The outcome I 
of these arguments makes little difference to the concept of 
free will that has been formulated here. The important thing, 
which both sides of the question would probably admit, is that 
the individual starts with something that is given at birth. 
I 
In all of the aspects of growth the individual is presented 
.! with possibilities of action, facts about the environment, and I~ 
,! memory of past experiences. This becomes the matrix of conscio, s 
11 experience in which the self determines uniformities. The self jl 
;1 then, is limited in its freedom by the variety of possibilities 
I 
1! of'fered in this w..a.trix. 
It must be admitted that there are various levels of con- I 
I 
sciousness at which the self determines different patterns of I 
I· 
there :/ action, and there can be little doubt about the fact that 
.I 
are many patterns of action which are almost entirely given in 
I 
~--'·: 
! the ~hysical structure of the individual. Thus, most reflex 
,. 
I 
action could hardly be said to be the result of a conscious 
choice. Likewise, many uniformities, that is, habits, social 
customs, sentiments, attitudes, and the like, are determined by 
the self, or accepted passively by the self at an unconscious 
level. At this level the individual is largely shaped by hered-
l ity and environment. 
II 
I 
I Furthermore, there is considerable evidence of indetermin-
I 
I 
ate, arbitrary, effortless action which may or may not be attri-
1 
lbuted to the existence of free will. It maKes little difference 
1 
to the real significance of freedom and the point will not be 
argued. If the significance of free will was nothing more than 
1 the ability of the self to carry out this kind of action, then 
1human freedom would have little meaning. 
I 
~1 
1'he real significance of human freedom is seen in the life 
of the individual as he reaches maturity. It is in this period 
that a fully conscious self makes significant free determina-
tions of three kinds: (1) The critical examination of many of 
those uniformities accepted earlier at the unconscious level, 
leading to a rejection, revision, or reacceptance of those uni-
formities; (2) The determination of new uniformities consistent 
with the total personality; (3) The determination by the self ~ 
of certain single significant decisions which must be consistent 
/with (1) and (2) but are distinct from them. 
72 
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5. Science with Free Will 
The purpose of this section is to examine the relation 
I 
!between the science of human behavior and the formulation of 
1free will given above. Any break in a strict causal sequence, 
I 
any situation in which a given state is not always followed by 
I ~ 
I 
It 
the same state, must represent a definite limitation on the 
possibility of formulating causal laws that will uniquely des- I 
I ·I cribe a sequence of events in which such a break occurs. In the I' 
formulation of 
I 
the concept of free will given above it was nee- I 
I 
essary to make 
I 
the hypothesis that such breaks or acausal sit-
uations do occur at least in the area of mental states. If the 
above formulation is to be accepted as valid it must be shown 
I 
,f hat the limitations which would follow from this formulation 
are not inconsistent with the present state of affairs in the 
sciences t h at deal with human behavior. A complete review of the 
social and psychological sciences from this point of view is 
'beyond the scope of this thesis. The considerations which follow 
I II 
'' are intended to indicate only the most general aspects of the 
I 
'lproblem. 
The first limitation which the above formulation of the 
!concept of free will imposes on the sciences dealing with human ,I 
'behavior is that these sciences must give up any hope o1' attain- II 
iing a complete causal description of human behavior. In view ot· II 
1
the fact that physics has, more or less reluctantly, been 1'orced I 
I 
to accept the same limitation in its description of the physical 
world, this does not seem to be an unre asonable limi tation to 
1,__. __ ----=---= 
I 
I 
! impose on the social and psychological sciences. Certainly, none ! 
I I 
1
of the present results of these sciences indicate that such a 
~~ description is definitely on the way. 
I However, since the self determines uniformities in more or 
1 
less consistent patterns, these uniformities may be considered II 
Ito be causal and 
1 The laws of 
,l tistical at best 
thus capable of being studied by science. 
the social and psychological sciences are sta-
and a form of limited free will need not be 
1 inconsistent with such laws. 
1. Weaver, Art.(l948). 
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CHA.P'TER VII 
THE ME'l'APHYSI OJ\.L PROBLEM 
l. The Nature of the Problem. 
Met aphysics is that branch of philosophy which seeks to 
know the fundamental nature ol the unive rse. It seeks to go 
beyond the facts of t he s enses and beyond sc ienti f ic descrip tion 
to the basic reality of the unive r s e. A metaphysical ~roblem 1
1 arises whenever man seeks to know the ult imate nature of the J, 
universe , or, whenever his thinking _presupposes the existence 0 
a p articular kind of basic real i ty. It is _t.Jerhaps due to the 
latter that science is faced with a metaphysical problem. 
As .:in ::: :bhe p roblem of f ree will, the metaphysical problem is 
to a larg e extent in the area of speculative philosophy. A pro-
per treatment of the problem would require an examination of 
conc epts not only o i the sciences but of all significant a re as 
of human investi gation. Obviously, such an examination i s f ar 
beyond the scop e of this thesis. The nature of the p roblems 
examined in the p revious chapters calls for a f ew brief remar k s 
concerning the meta~hysical aspects of these problems. 
2. The Nature of the External World . 
Vve came to the conclusion in Chapter III that in order to 
avoid a vievv of comple te solips ism we must accep t the postulate 
'I of the existence of a re al external world inde1Jendent o:fl sense-
I 
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I exp erience. 1'he relation between an ob ject in the external 
I 
I 
I 
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Jand the perception of it in human experience is largely an epis 
j temological one and cannot be discussed here. That is, given 
1
the existence of the external world, what is the nature of our 
knowledge of that world? There are many theories on this sub-
l ject. For example, we might say that the object gives rise to 
I a sense-object, that aspect of the object which is capable of 
!being detected b y the senses. The sense-object, being detected 
I 
by the sensory nerves is analyzed into a group of sense-data 
which travel up the various nerve channels to the brain. ~Y.hat 
1
we are conscious of, however is not this group of sensations, 
but rather a sense-experience, a complex pattern of sensations, 
exp e rienced as a W<~hole. The recognition of the meaning of this 
1sense-experience in its c ontext and in relation to past exper-
1 iences might be called a perception. The inadequacy of this 
I 
brief and oversimplified presentation is granted. However, 
there is an important metaphysical problem that lies behind this 
I 
I 
epistemological theory. Given this series, or any other series '/i 
of events taking place in the knowing process between object an I 
perception, is it p ossible for there to be a complete change in 
the fundamental nature of the entities involved? To put it 
briefly, if perception is mental can the object be materiAl? 
one fundamental I I If the series must be a process taking place in 
reality, is that reality mental or material in nature? These 
/i 
I 
are the basic problems of metaphysics and approached in the 
above manner center around the relation between mind and body. 
All of the various theories of the relation between mind 
I 
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and body cannot be discussed here. The four that are . briefly 
presented are sufficient to bring to light some relevant facts 
toward a possible solution of the problem of the nature of the 
external world. 
In the first place, interactionism, which allows the exist 1 
ence of both mind and matter and their interaction, does not I 
I 
solve the metaphysical problem; it merely restates it, far, thi~ 
1 view gives us no hint as to how such an interaction could pos-
sibly take place. This view was implicitly adopted 
the problem of free will as a means of avoiding the 
problem in that particular discussion. 
in discussin g 
metaphysic a~ 
I' 
Materialism is at least more consistent in maintaining 
mind is actually matter, but it is difficult to reconcile this 
1 
·I view with many of the facts of conscious experience. Conscious j . 
~~ ness as experienced is mental in nature; the existence of matte I' 
:f or an external world that is material in nature, is a theory I 
I derived from conscious experience. I 
Epiphenomenalism allows the existan~e of mind but insists 
that mind is a passive by-product of matter and motion. A 
I 
·I recent form of 
1 
this view has been suggested by Haldane 
II 
I 
in 1 'I I 
-which mind is a resonance between large aggregates such as cell • 
Regardless of the particular for.m of this view, however, there 
is a difficulty that arises from the statement that mind 
- I 
is a I, 
by-product of matter. ~fuere is this by-product produced? 
terms of the series outlined above, clearly the object, the 
1. Haldane, Art. (1934), 95 
In 
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/ sense-object, and t he s ense - data (electrical bnpulses in the 
nerve s truc ture) a re material. 'l1he. sense-exp erience, being men~ 
tal, must be the by-product. 'I'hi s "mind production" must take 
I 
!p lace at the point where the sense-data after traveling up the 
nerve structure come to a halt, or the terminus of the nerve 
endings in the brain. Mind, then, ls }Jroduced in, and confined 
1
! to, the · area in the immediate vicinity of' the terminus of the 
I 
I 
!nerve endings. At this point we are reminded of ~earson 's clerk 
trapp ed in a telephone exchange . It is 
p h enomenalism, and perhaps materialism 
I 
difficult to see how epi- ,11 
also, can avoid the incon~ 
of the telephone exchang ~ sistencies involved in the me taphysics 
I 
Burtt1 finds in the writings of Huxley a position very sira- 1 
i il &r to that of Pearson. Burtt's analys i s of tnis p os i tion fore 
him to the same conclusions that Fullerton arrived at from Pear-
son, namely that t he view that mind is tra~}Jed at the t erminus 
of the nerve endings in the brain result s i n a complete solip -
sism. Burtt adds some interesting conclusions in regard to the 
2 
natur·e of the external world an.d mind: 
(The) material world in its spatial ex_t-~anse seems to be an 
object of mind, but not its cause nor its comp lete stimulus • 
• • • iHnd appears to be an irreducible something that can 
know the world of extended matter, love ardently its order 
and beauty, and transf orm it continually in the light of a 
st i ll more attractive and commanding g ood. 
If mind, then, is iri'educible, and ii' we a1~e to aV'Oid the 
/
1 
mystery of inte ract i onism., we seem . to be f orced to the conclu-
1 
i I sion that the ult imate nature of· the external world is mental. 
II 
J In other words, mind is the bas l c reality of the universe. This 
/ 1. Burtt, l'fJ.PS, 305- 310. 
====---,==1: 
2. Burtt, MFS, 318. 
I: 
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and the ir im~lications cannot be taKen up here . However, there I 
is one point in connection with 5cience that is too important to 
be neglected ,in this discuss ion. 
There is a natural objection to idealism because it des~ 
troys the common sense view of "solid matter 11 • The familiar idea1 
I 
of matter is so different from the experience of mind or con-
sc iousness that it is difficult to accept the idealistic posi-
tion wholeheartedly . The science of the last century was a good 
supporter of materialism. liiodern science has changed this posi-
tion. "Solid matter" is found to be so vastly diiTerent from the 
I 
comraon sense view that the scientists themselves cannot reach 
full agreement as to exactly w!).at their theories mean. Idealism 
/has found considerable support in the interpretations of the 
lresults of modern science. The extent to which this is justi -
li tied depends on one 1 s particular view of the rneaning of scien-
)11 tific conce_tJts. 
, There are many who believe tha t the question of mind or 
!matter as the basic reality lies in the area of badly posed 
!questions. There a re many others that believe that t he question 
I 
' is basically unanswerable. Russell's r ec ent analysis of the 
I 
problem of knowledge takes the latter .tJOint or view in regard 
to this question. He points out that although we know mental 
i events dir•ec tly , that ls, without inference, we only know phy-
/ s ical events by inference. Hence, we have no basis for a compar -
l of one against the other: 
I 
I 
ll - T=h=-=e=q=u=a"-"l=l=. =t =i=e=s= t=l=1=a=t= c omp o s e such events ( _p h ys i cal events ) 
1 are unkhown--so com_r:>letely unkn own that we cannot say 
either that they are or that they are not different f rom 
the qualities t h at we l<:now as be longing to mental events •1 
3. The Metaphysics of Modern Science. 
l 
i 
The methods of physical science have produced a grou~ of 
interrelated concepts which may be said to describe a world. We 
may c all this world the physical world for the sake of simplicit 1 • 
In Chapter IV we exrunined the reality of the objects of sclenti - 1 
fie concepts, or the reality of t he ~hysical world as defined 
above. But, unless the _physical world is identically equivalent ' 
I to the real world, we have the further .i:)roblem of determining 
the relation between the physical world and the whole of the 
real world and perhaps finding some element that is common to 
1botb . This problem should not be thought of as independent of 
the prob lem as it was presented in the l as t section. Rather, it 
is a different approach to, a different as.tJect of the same basic 
metaphysical problem. 'I'his discussion will not attem_;:Jt to solve 
the above problem; it will only attempt to show that the p roblem 
ll does exi s t, in other words, that the j;Jhysical world may not be 
!consi dered equivalent to the whole of the real worl d . 
For the _purpose of scientific investigation we may say that 
the physical world is identical with the real vvorld. For t hat 
!purpose it is an entirely legitimate assuraption to ~ake. It fol-
l ows f rom this assumption that science de s cr i bes the real world. 
JI But this amounts to nothing mor e t han a definition of the term 
/1 . Russ ell, HK, 231. 
_Jj 
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"real world 11 • 
This def inition is pe r fe ctly satisfactory in the a r ea of 
scientific investigation . After all, the only world which is 
real in this investigation is the world which science describes, 
I so the re can be little danger in defining the real world as that 
world which science describes. 
However, it sometime s happens that a scientist nakes the 
statement t h at there is no legitimate method of investigation 
other than the scientific method. Hence, the only r eal world is 
the world described by s cience. But the statement is no longer 
i just a c onvenient operating procedure ; it is a dogmatic philoso-
phical position and may be evaluat ed as such . 
Before the rise of modern physics such a position comraonly 
took the form of materialistic mechanism . But the d i sc overies 
of modern physics necessitated an abandonnent of many of the 
basic conc ep ts of this view even on their scientific validity 
alone. The result of this has been the adoption of a rather .. : 
strict p ositivism in the foundations of modern physical the ory . 
This ls particularly noticeable in the foundations of quantw:1 
the ory which makes no claim of describing or predicting anything 
other than that which can be the object of a physical measure -
ment. Quantum theory might be s a id to be a mathematics of obser-
vable quantities . 
The adoption of the strict positivistic position f or the 
,. 
jpurposes of scientific investigation in the realm of atomic 
I 
~ events has le d to considerable success in arrivine at an inter-
Sl 
·-~ 
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I 
jpretation of t hese events. Howeve r, the success of this view 
I t h at 
in~ 
particul ar realm does not necessarily warrant its adoption !I 
I 
I 
J as a valid philosophical p osition. 
It We saw i n Chapter III that the strict positivist p osition 
in re ga rd to the p~oblem of the existen ce of the e x ternal world 
l e ads to an almost unavoidable solipsism. A construct of sense-
' 
I 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
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I CHAPTER VIII ' 
I CONCLUSIONS II 
I The pur~ose of this chapter is to survey the principal con- I 
I I 
l clusions that have been reached in this discussion. These cQnclu; 
1/ sions wil l be examined according to how they fi t into the d ef·in-
l ition of philosophy of science given above rather than in the 
1 
order ln which they were presented in the discussion . 
I 
I Philosovhy of science was defined earlier as the critical 
I 
11 examination of the presuppositions, methods, and concepts of li 
! science, the examination of the relati'ons of the special branche~  
of science to each other and to other fields of study' and the rl 
integration of the discoveries of science into the total picture! 
I 
of human experience . Certain conclusions have been dravm in re- I 
gard to each of these three aspects of the J,>hllosophy of scienceJ. 
The presupposition of the external world in science was ~ 
examined. It was shown that a positivistic approach to a solu- I 
Ji tion to this problem leads to an unavoidable solipsism. In all 
/i probability there is no solution to this problem in the sense 
li that we can prove the existence cf the external world from othe1 ! 
~~ considerations . However, it seems that any discussion that j 
~~ attempts to disprove the existence of the external world cannot 11 
·
1 avoid the assumption of its existence at some p o int in the dis - /1 
!: cussion. We therefore conclude that the existence of an externa // 
!: 
/i world independent of individual consciousness is an 
--~~-
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hypothesis. 
A similar situation was found to exist in regard to the 
presupp osition that a degree of probable truth can be assigned 
to a g eneral proposition or hypothesis even though it is only 
possible to verify the truth of the proposition empirically in 
Ia limited munber of actual cases. Thus , we accept the inductive 
method of verifying empirical Knowledge not because we can prove 
that the inductive principle is valid but because without it we 
would have to give up almost all of what we believe to be know-
ledge. The assumption of the validi ty of the inductive principle 
1does not, however, bestow certainty on any em~irically based 
I 
knowledge; it only allows us to assert the degree of probability! 
of the truth of any empirically based knowledge. 
Compar~tively little has been said in this thesis with 
reg ard to a critical examination of the method of science. Two 
! g ener a l conclusions were reached in ~he course of the discussion ,,-
'i1 0ne conclusion was that there seems to be no specific set of 
rules that enable one to proceed from facts to general laws or 
!hypotheses. In this sense, there is no such thing as an inductiv : 
ll method~ 'I'he second conclusion -- was that although the methods of 
I science have proved extremely powerful in gaining an understand-
!! ing of the world, we should not deny the possibility of other 
;methods of gaining truth. Thus, although the flavor of scientif-
1 
ic me t hod is quite positivistic today , it does not mean that 
positivism is necessarily a valid philosophical view. Indeed, I 4 , 
84 
lather considerations seem to indicate that positivism is defin- I 
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\i itely inadequate as an overall philosophical standpoint. ! 
The meaning of scientific concepts was examined and severa~l 
different points of view were discussed. No final conclusion was j 
I 
'1 reached as to which of the views presented was the best. Pear-
i 
1 son's strict positivism seemed to offer an I entirely too limited I 
I i view of the significance of scientific concepts. Bridgman's 
operationalism is a distinct advance over Pearson's view and 
I probably represents to a larg e extent the views of many present 
scientists. However, it does not seem to offer a meaningful 
interpretation of some of the basic concepts that arise particu- j 
larly in the more mathematical aspects of 
11 conventionalism offers, perhaps, a deeper 
the sciences. Poincare j1 s 
I 
insight into the mean- [ 
I [ ing of many of these concep ts , which also seem to be the most 
fundamental in the structure of physical knowledge. 
,f 
Poincare's, and even more so, Eddington's, views stress the 
importance of the knowtng operations in the formation of scien-
tific concepts. The conclusion seems to be that man creates at 
l least part of the physical universe in his attempts to g ain 
knowledge of the physical universe. 
The positivistic views seem to avoid the problem of the 
r eality of the objects to which scientific concepts refer, othe 
,! than to assert the reality of those objects, or aspects of ob-
I 
I jects, which 
I 1 a dherence to 
,I 
this principle, however, is
1
likely to lead to a I' 
can be the cbje ~t of sense observations . Strict 
!1 solip sistic view of all reality. Poincare modifies this positio 1 
I 
I and as serts that the relations between entities in the physical 
[i 
tl 
I 
I 
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not the entities themselves, are all that we can know /i '' universe, 
of the physical reality. The realists as sert that the physical ll 
1 
reality is just what science can discover that it is. 1· 
The conclusion that was drawn from this discussion was that 
II 
scientific concepts do not occupy a privileged position among 
I 
the other concepts that go together to constitute knowledge of 
the external world. If the entities referred to in scientific 
concepts are real, then the entities referred to in other types I! 
of concepts must be real also. Likewise, if the entities re-
ferred to in scientific concepts are ~knowable, then so must 
be the entities referred to in the concepts we hold in all types 
I 
of knowledge. 
The concept of causality, as a particular scientific con-
cept, seems to be that concept in the structure of scientific ,J 
knowledge which describes, or represents, the . observed uniform- I· 
ity in the processes of the physical universe .. The following !I 
formulation of t h is concept was adopted: causality may be said l 
to exist, or be operating, when a given state A is always fol- II 
lowed by the same state B. The states may then be said to be 
causally connected. But t his formulation is vague without a 
il 
' definition of the term "state" in each particular application of 
the concept. There seems to be no unique way of: def:ining this I 
term so that it will fit all cases. In practice it appears 
that the s.tate . of the system being studied is simply defined in 
I 
such a way that, once defined, the states will be causally con-
1
, 
nected. In other words, the concept of causality is itself a 
-r-== 
1 
definition of the term "state" in the sense that only states 
that are thus defined may be subjected to scientific study. 
That is to say, science can only study causally connected sys-
' tems or states. 
Little has been said in t his thesis on the relations of 
the special branches of science to each other and to other 
fields of study. This is a significant problem in the philoso-
phy of science and warrants careful attention. Far from being 
a mere academic problem, it is being faced constantly in the 
large coop erative research projects that require the sk illed 
'! -
knowledge of specialists in many different branches of science. 
I 
An attempt was made to interpret some of the results of 
modern physical science, particularly the uncertainty principle 1 
, and modern quantum t heory , and integrate these interpretations 1
1 
into the total picture of experience. The two chief interpreta-
tions of the uncertainty principle, _determinism and indeter-
minism, were briefly presented, and it ·was indicated that 
1 seems to be no way_ to _ deci~e between the t wo views on the 
there 1\ 
basis I 
I 
of the scientific content o:f the uncertainty principle. 
! The principal topic disc'\lssed in connection with the integ 1 
,I ration . of scientific . discoveries into the total philosophical . 11 
perspective was the problem o~ ~ree will. The strict determin- ~~~ 
. I 
ist position was found to be inadequate as _a philosophical view I 
since, if it were actually the truth, it could not make the /1 
slightest difference in what we do. It was s hown that a theory /1 
of free will could be established independ~ntly of _the interpreJ 
I 
,r 
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will is base d on the following three hypotheses: (l) Mental 
st a tes can affect physical states; (2) There exists a certain 
amount of indeterminacy i n mental states; (3) The individual 
possesses the power to intrmduce into an indeterminate mental 
state factors sufficient to make that situation determinate. 
The result of this is a limited view of human freedom. The fiel 
of choice is determined by externa l factors. Operating within 
this limited field the individual can make certain choices and, 
with a sufficient knowledge of the causal factors operating in 
his physical environment, can expect that results of his choice 
I will be realized within the accuracy of his evaluat i on of the 
I 
situa tion at h and. 
The discussion indicates that the hypothes's above do not 
contradict any of the results of s cience. Furthermore the view 
of freedom that resu lts from the adoption of these hyp otheses 
offers a reasonably a ccurat e account of the subjecti ve experience 
I 
of freedom, and offers an account of the present success of the 1 
methods of science as applied to the are a of individual human 
behavior. The conclusion is tha t although science can never 
expect to be able to describe and predict human behavi or with 
perfect a ccuracy, it can expect to a ttain a considerable degree 
of ac curacy , certainly more than enough to warrant the study. 
If this view of freedom is to have any meaning, then the 
! reality of the individual mind must be admitted. Whether or not 
we must a ccept the idealistic metaphysics and assert that all 
!reality 
=~~·---
is of the nature of mind is a question that has been but 
1 
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briefly discussed in this thesis and no definite conclusion will 
be offered . Certainly there is nothing in the results of modern 
scientific knowledge that would flatly contradict this view. 
Although a materialistic, or strictly me chanistic philosophy 
would definitely exclude a theory of human freedom such as that 
above, there are proba.bly a number of philosophical views which 
could be in harmony with the view of freedom presente d here. 
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I 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine a selected group 
1
of problems fundamental to the ~hilosophy of science. 
The functions of philosophy and science are briefly examin- 1 
t I 1ed and several views are considered. This leads to a definition 
of the philosophy of science as the critical examination of the 
presuppositions, methods, and concepts of science, the e xamina-
l tion of the relations of the special branches of science to each 
other and to other fields of study, and the integration of the 
discoveries of science into the total picture of human exper-
ience. 
The epistemological problem is considered, the discussion 
being centered around the problem of the external. Pearson's 
lview is considered and is shown to lead to an almost unavoidable 
solipsism. The discussion attempts to show that almost any 
·~method of' accounting for the existence of an external world by 
ian examination of the facts of consciousnes~implicitly assumes 
the existence of the external world. The conclusion seems to be 
that the existence of an external world, although unprovable, is 1
1 an unavoidable postulate. 
The principle of induction is examined briefly as a method 
of gaining knowledge of the external world. As a principle by 
!means of 
il general 
I 
which a degree of probable truth can be assigned to a 
proposition or hypothesis even though it is only poss-
93 
-~~ ible to verify the truth of the proposition empirically in a 
[J limited number of actual cases, the principle of induction 
I [ seems to be another unprovable, but unavoidable, postulate. 
I 
I The problem of the reality of the objects of scientific 
/
1
concepts is considered. A major portion of the discussion cen-
11 
) ters around the meaning of scientific concepts according to sey 
I 
! eral views. This is done by examining the extent to which the 
data and the knowing operations determine the formation of a 
concept according to the various views. Pearson's view is exam-
ined, in which scientific concep ts are found to be chief'ly aids 
in the classification of the data of science. This view is 
IJ criticized as being too passive. Bridgman's more recent form of 
p ositivism is examined and is found to be much more satisfactor1 
than that of Pearson. Bridgman's op erationalism represents the 
t views of a large group of modern scientists in the ir attitude 
I [ toward the concepts of science, but as a form of positivism it 
[ is perhaps open to criticism as a philosophical point of view. 
Poincare's conventionalism is examined and is found to give 
!perhaps the most meaningful account of the scientific concep ts 
that are contained i n the structure of physical knowledge in 
its purest form. In this view, in contrast to Pears on's and I 
Bridgman's views, the knowing ope rations take on a highly sign- I 
ifican~ role in the forma t i on of scientific conce~ts. The view ,. 
I 
II of the scientific realists is not very different from that of 
I 
the modified p ositivists such as Poincare except that for the I 
I 
I• 
r 
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===j[ realists the knowing operat i ons are ess entially acts of discov- L_ 
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ery instead of acts of invention or creation as they are for the 
modified positivists. I Eddington's view is presented as being 
I perhaps the most rationalistic of any view of scientific con-
1
1 cepts. 
I 
I 
1
/ The more strict forms of positivism such as is found in 
11 Pearson and Bridgman are found to be in danger of falling into 
,J 
II a solipsism from a philosophical point of view with regard to 
I 
the reality of the objects the concepts are supposed to describ~ . 
Poincare admits a certain amount of subjectivity in scientific - ~ 
I 
concepts and holds that the only knowable reality is that which ! 
exists in the relations between the objects, not in the objects , 
- . II 
themselves. The realists, on the other hand, perhaps go too I 
far in their faith in the reality of the objects. I 
The concept of causality is examined as a particular ex-
' i 
ample of a scientific concept. Basically it seems to be that I 
concept in the structure of scientific knowledge which describes, 
or represents, the observed uniformity ~the processes of the 
physical universe. I Several formulations of the concept are exa-
1 
mined and found to be inadequate. The formulation that was 
adopted states that causality may be said to exist, or be oper- I 
1-
ating, whenever a given state A is always followed by the same ,1 
I 
state B. The states may then be said to be causally connected. li 
The concept of causality is itself a definition of the term 
"state" in the sense that only those states that are causally 
connected may be subject to scientific study. 
The significance of the rise of modern quantum theory is _ 
1 96 
briefly examined to illustrate the meaning of the concept of 
II 
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I 
causality. The controversy between the determinists and the in : 
determinists is b~_p/efly examined but no attempt is made to de-
cide between the two views. I 
I The problem of free will is considered, with the discussion 
centering around the meaning of the concept of causality as it r 
i 
is applied to the area of human behavior. The position of the 
~i complete determinist is examined and is found to be irrefutable : 
,j in the last analysis, but unsatisfactory since it offers no 
positive results. An attempt is made to establish a view of 
1 
1 free will independent of the outcome of the controversy between ;I 
I 
the indeterminist and the determinist views on the physical I 
world. This view of free will is based on three hypotheses: /i 
(1) Mental states can affect physical states; (2) There exists 11 
a certain amount of indet erminacy in mental states; (3) The 
1 individual possesses the power to introduce into an indetermin- i 
I 
ate mental state factors sufficient to make that situation 
1 determinate. This leads to a view of limited human freedom 
which .seems to be in harmony with the concepts of science and 
offers an account of the experience of freedom subjectively. 
The discussion turns finally to the metaphysical problem 
involved in the philosophy of science. The metaphysical con-
siderations involved in the problem of the external world are 
centered around the mind-body problem but the discussion is 
too brief to warrant significant conclusions. The metaphysics 
, of modern science, positivism, is examined and criticized. 
